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Recent years have seen wide fluctuations in the value of currencies on
the foreign exchange markets.' As a result, those who participate in
transnational business transactions now face greater risks when they be-
come creditors on a foreign currency liability. This risk is exacerbated
when the creditor must turn to U.S. courts to satisfy a foreign currency
debt. Under the home currency judgment rule,2 United States courts
have required all judgments to be granted in U.S. currency and have not
recognized that an award in a foreign currency may better serve the in-
terests of the injured party. English courts have recently thrown off
three and a half centuries of similar precedent and are now granting
judgments in foreign currencies. It is time for the United States to aban-
don its out-dated rules on foreign currency liabilities and adopt an ap-
proach consistent with modem commercial realities.
By providing that courts may render judgments either in U.S. dollars
or in foreign currency, section 823 of Tentative Draft No. 6 of the Re-
statement (Revised) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States
t Assistant Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh. The author thanks Professor Ed-
ward L. Symons, Jr. for valuable comments on an earlier draft and Victoria Archer, Louis G.
Bocianoski, and Glenn P. Cummings for excellent research assistance.
1. Wide currency fluctuations date most recently from President Nixon's 1971 decision to
allow the dollar to float against other currencies. See 7 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1168,
1170-71 (Aug. 15, 1971). For a general discussion of the implications of the closing of the
"gold window" in 1971, see K. DAM, THE RULES OF THE GAME 175-210 (1982); Gold, Sym-
metry as a Legal Objective of the International Monetary System, 12 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL.
423 (1980). Governmental intervention has recently contributed to exchange rate fluctuation
with the agreement, in the fall of 1985, between the U.S. and four major trading partners, to
drive down the value of the U.S. dollar. See U.S. and 4 Allies Move to Cut Value of Dollar,
N.Y. Times, Sept. 23, 1985, at Al, col. 6; Dollar Plunges to 16-Month Low in Reaction to 5
Nations' Accord, N.Y. Times, Sept. 24, 1985, at Al, col. 4. In addition, rapid currency ex-
change rate fluctuation during the period between the end of the gold standard in roughly 1914
and the beginning of the Bretton Woods System in 1945 elicited substantial scholarly com-
ment. See infra note 11. '
2. See infra notes 6-9 and accompanying text.
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attempts to avoid the problematic home currency judgment rule.3 How-
ever, the proposed change does not avoid the confusing and inappropri-
ate secondary rules used to determine the exchange rate to be applied in
converting a foreign currency liability to a U.S. currency judgment. By
continuing to allow judgment in U.S. dollars when a foreign currency
judgment would be more appropriate, the new Restatement rule fails to
take this necessary second step. An acceptable rule not only must recog-
nize that U.S. courts can give judgment in a foreign currency or its
equivalent, but also must provide for judgment in the most appropriate
currency, compensate the plaintiff for any post-injury loss resulting from
exchange rate fluctuation, and provide for pre- and post-judgment inter-
est at a rate appropriate to the currency of judgment.
As an alternative to section 823 of the Draft Restatement, this Article
will propose a rule consistent with a proper reading of current U.S. law
that better meets the exigencies of international commerce. In order to
facilitate an understanding of this rule, Part I provides a brief review of
the current U.S. rules and discusses the practical problem facing the
transnational merchant. Part II surveys the development of the home
currency judgment rule in England, along with its recent modification
there. This discussion sets the stage for Part III, which outlines the mis-
conceptions inherent in the U.S. rules. Part III also describes recent de-
velopments that serve as the basis for the creation of a better rule. Part
IV then turns to the new Restatement provision and offers an alternative
designed to remedy the problems left unresolved by that provision.
I. The U.S. Legal Framework and the Practical Problem
U.S. rules dealing with judgments on liabilities stated in foreign cur-
rencies are founded on legislation as long-standing as the Currency Act
of 17924 and on case law as respected as the choice-of-law jurisprudence
of Justice Holmes. 5 However, through blind allegiance to oft-stated
rules, courts and commentators have ignored the fact that neither the
Currency Act nor the Holmesian analysis either requires or any longer
3. RE TATEMENT (REvISED) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 823 (Tent. Draft No. 6,
1985). See also RESTATEMENT (REvISED) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 853 (Tent. Draft
No. 5, 1984).
4. An Act Establishing a Mint, and Regulating the Coins of the United States of 1792, 1
Stat. 246, 250 (codified prior to Sept. 13, 1983, at 31 U.S.C. § 371, and after Sept. 13, 1983, at
31 U.S.C. § 5101) [hereinafter cited as Currency Act of 1792].
5. Die Deutsche Bank filiale Nurenberg v. Humphrey, 272 U.S. 517 (1926); Hicks v. Guin-




supports those rules. They have further failed to recognize the underly-
ing principles so important to a just resolution of disputes involving for-
eign currency liabilities.
The home currency judgment rule requires that foreign currency
claims be converted to dollar judgments and that the date of conversion
is a matter for judicial determination. U.S. federal courts have dealt with
the conversion date question as a conflict of laws problem. This ap-
proach was developed by Justice Holmes in two opinions which have
been interpreted to provide that, if a foreign currency liability is payable
or otherwise arises in the U.S., courts will apply the exchange rate ex-
isting on the date of the injury, 6 whereas if the same obligation arises in
the foreign jurisdiction, courts will treat the obligation as arising under
foreign law and apply the exchange rate existing on the date the judg-
ment is rendered in the United States. 7 The rationale is that, with a lia-
bility due or arising in the United States, the innocent party should
receive what he would otherwise have been entitled to on the perform-
ance date, in the case of a contract claim, or on the date of injury, in the
case of a tort claim.8 On the other hand, if the amount first became
payable in a foreign jurisdiction, or is otherwise governed by foreign law,
then there is no right of recovery in the United States until an action is
filed on the claim, the date of judgment being when that right is first
determinable in U.S. currency. 9
Most state courts, led by New York, have tended to avoid the nuances
of Justice Holmes' choice-of-law analysis by adopting a strict breach date
rule. 10 The breach date rule provides adequate protection of reasonable
economic expectations of the injured party when the currency of the fo-
rum has been the stronger currency over time; the judgment date rule
provides such protection when the home currency has been the weaker
currency. Neither, however, provides consistently appropriate results in
all circumstances.1
6. Hicks v. Guinness, 269 U.S. 71 (1925).
7. Die Deutsche Bank fijale Nurenberg v. Humphrey, 272 U.S. 517 (1926).
8. Hicks, 269 U.S. at 80.
9. Die Deutsche Bank, 272 U.S. at 520.
10. See, eg., Hoppe v. Russo-Asiatic Bank, 235 N.Y. 37, 138 N.E. 497 (1923); Gross v.
Mendel, 225 N.Y. 633, 121 N.E. 871 (1918), afl'g 171 App. Div. 237, 157 N.Y.S. 357 (1916);
Kantor v. Aristo Hosiery Co., 248 N.Y. 630, 162 N.E. 553 (1928), aifig 222 App. Div. 502,
226 N.Y.S. 582 (1928); Sokoloff v. National City Bank of New York, 250 N.Y. 69, 164 N.E.
745 (1928); Parker v. Hoppe, 257 N.Y. 333, 178 N.E. 550 (1931).
11. The articles, comments, and notes written on this issue have been numerous. The
Anglo-American pieces can generally be divided into three categories:
(1) Those writers favoring a judgment date rule when applying a home currency judgment
assumption. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 144 (1971); F. MANN, THE
LEGAL ASPECT OF MONEY 315 (1st ed. 1953) (But see F. MANN, THE LEGAL ASPEcT OF
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Assume a U.S. seller and a West German buyer in a transaction in
which the contract price of the goods is 100,000 Deutsch marks. The
German buyer breaches by nonpayment, and the following exchange
rates occur (based on two possible scenarios depending on which cur-
rency remains stronger):
Strong $ Strong DM
$/DM $/DM
Contract date 1/4 ($25,000) 1/4 ($25,000)
Breach date 1/5 ($20,000) 1/3 ($33,333)
Judgment date 1/6 ($16,666) 1/2 ($50,000)
Payment date (actual) 1/8 ($12,500) 1/1 ($100,000)
The amounts in parentheses represent the dollar value of the original
contract price of DM 100,000, based on each of the exchange rates.
Based on these figures, a plaintiff would want the exchange rate to be
computed at the earliest possible date in times of a strong dollar. On the
other hand, in times of a weak dollar the plaintiff would favor use of the
exchange rate in effect at the latest date possible.
If U.S. courts would give judgment in the foreign currency as the cur-
rency of the contract, it would not matter whether an action on the con-
tract was brought in the United States or in Germany. Either way,
judgment would be for DM 100,000. However, if the plaintiff selects a
U.S. forum and has the option to demand payment in either currency, or,
as has been the consistent practice in U.S. courts, judgment is available
MONEY 325 (4th ed. 1982)) [unless otherwise indicated, all succeeding footnotes refer to the
4th edition (1982) of this treatise]; A. NUSSBAUM, MONEY IN THE LAW NATIONAL AND
INTERNATIONAL 372 (2d ed. 1950); Evan, Rationale of Valuation of Foreign Money Obliga-
tions, 54 MICH. L. REv. 307 (1956); Fraenkel, Foreign Moneys in Domestic Courts, 35 COLUM.
L. REV. 360 (1935).
(2) Those writers favoring a breach date rule. Eder, Legal Theories of Money, 20 CORNELL
L.Q. 52 (1934); Gluck, The Rate of Exchange in the Law of Damages, 22 COLUM. L. REV. 217
(1922); McNair, Rate of Exchange in English Judgments, 37 LAW Q. REV. 38 (1921).
(3) Those writers favoring an ad hoc approach. Note, The Need to Retreat From Inflexible
Conversion Rules-An Equitable Approach to Judgment in Foreign Currency, 22 SANTA
CLARA L. REv. 871 (1982); Note, Conversion of Judgments Measured in Foreign Currencies,
39 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 165 (1982); Note, Conversion Date of Foreign Money Obligations, 65
COLUM. L. REV. 490 (1965).
One writer prefers the date suit was brought as the appropriate time to determine the rele-
vant exchange rate. Jones, The Spurious Judgment Day Rule for Converting Foreign Currency
into Dollars When Suit is Brought Upon an Obligation Governed by Foreign Law: Deutsche
Bank filiale Nurenberg v. Humphrey Revisited, 3 INT'L LAW. 277 (1969).
Other articles on the subject include Becker, The Currency of Judgment, 25 AM. J. COMP.
L. 152 (1977); Drake, The Proper Rule in Fluctuating Exchanges, 28 MICH. L. REV. 229
(1930); Drake, The Rule, The Principle, The Standard in Fluctuating Exchange, 25 MICH. L.
REV. 860 (1927); Drake, The Reckoning of Damages in Fluctuating Exchange, 23 MICH. L.
REV. 695 (1925); Negus, Rate of Exchange in Reference to Foreign Debts and Debts Expressed
in Foreign Currency, 40 LAW Q. REv. 149 (1924); Rifkind, Money as a Device for Measuring




only in the currency of the forum, the selection of the date at which the
exchange rate is computed can determine whether the plaintiff will
recover $100,000 or $25,000 in times of a weak dollar. Given the sub-
stantial variations in exchange rates in recent years, the determination of
which rate will be used has become almost as important as the initial
issue of liability itself.
II. Foreign Currency Judgments in the English Courts
"[I]f there is one thing clear in our law, it is that the claim must be
made in sterling and the judgment given in sterling."'1 2 Fifteen years af-
ter the above statement was made in United Railways, R.O. Wilberforce,
who had been counsel for the losing party, became a Lord of Appeal. On
November 5, 1975, he issued an opinion which, in effect, "says that a rule
of English law taken for granted by the Court of Appeal and the House
of Lords for some 350 years is no longer a rule of English Law." 13 In
Miliangos v. George Frank (Textiles) Ltd.,14 by giving judgment in a for-
eign currency, the House of Lords departed from a long line of cases
establishing that judgment must be given in sterling and that the date of
breach is the proper time to compute the exchange rate when a foreign
currency is involved.' 5 The House of Lords left unclear the exact
grounds upon which they based the new rule, and they clouded its subse-
quent application by specifically limiting the holding to judgments on a
debt expressed in a foreign currency in which the money of account,
12. Re United Railways of the Havana and Regla Warehouses, 1961 A.C. 1007, 1068-9,
listed sub non Tomkinson v. First Pennsylvania Banking and Trust Co., [1960] 2 W.L.R. 696
(H.L.) (Lord Denning M.R.).
13. Miliangos v. George Frank (Textiles) Ltd., [1975] Q.B. 487, 492 (C.A.) (Bristow, J.).
Judge Bristow's assumption that the rule had been unquestioned for some 350 years is borne
out by the 1661 case of Ward v. Kidswin, a case involving foreign currency, in which it was
stated:
And it was agreed by all [the judges] that in the case of foreign co', such as Flemish, one
must declare the value in English. Note that one can be charged for money as a receiver
and bailee for goods or for Hamburg money, provided it is not current here; and the
action is quite the same as for a box or a horse, etc.
Ward v. Kidswin, [1661] Lat. 77. The creditor could sue either in an ordinary action of debt
for the equivalent in English money or for the foreign money in "debt in the detinet." This
latter action, now long defunct, was closely related to detinue and entitled the plaintiff to a
conditional judgment for the foreign money or damages, the latter to be assessed by the jury.
See Rand v. Peck, 79 Eng. Rep. 527 (1622).
14. 1976 A.C. 443.
15. See, e.g., The Teh Hu, [1970] P. 106 (C.A.); Aruna Mills v. Dhanrajmal Gobindram,
[1968] 1 Q.B. 655; United Railways, 1961 A.C. 1007 (H.L.); Re British American Continental
Bank Ltd., Lisser and Rosenkranz's Claim, [1923] 1 Ch. 276 (C.A.); Lebeaupin v. Crispin,
[1920] 2 K.B. 714; Barry v. Van den Hurk, [1920] 2 K.B. 709; Di Fernando v. Simon, Smits &
Co., [1920] 3 K.B. 409 (C.A.); Manners v. Pearson & Son, [1898] 1 Ch. 581, 592.
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money of payment, and governing law were all foreign. 16 Although the
principal opinions in Miliangos rejected a "changed circumstances" ra-
tionale for parting from the well-established home currency judgment
rule, 17 recognition of the instability of floating exchange rates was an
important factor in the decision to allow judgment in a foreign cur-
rency.18 Cases following Miliangos have substantially expanded its nar-
row holding and make a review of that case, its predecessors, and its
progeny fundamental to a clear understanding of current English law on
foreign currency judgments.
A. The Genealogy of the Sterling Judgment and Breach Date Rules
The home currency and breach date rules were originally pronounced
in Manners v. Pearson & Son. 19 A British contractor doing business in
Mexico agreed to pay a Mexican businessman monthly installments in
Mexican currency based on the number of cubic meters of excavation.
The Mexican died in 1894. In 1897 the British firm offered to pay his
estate the 19,366 Mexican dollars due in either dollars or in the English
currency equivalent as of November 1897. Because the pound sterling
had appreciated in value against the Mexican dollar, the representative of
the deceased's estate contended that the conversion to English money
should be made at the exchange rate of the dates on which the amounts
had originally become payable. Lord Lindley asserted that "the courts of
16. Lord Wilberforce avoided declaring an expansive new rule by stating that he did "not
think that we are called upon or would be entitled in this case, to review the whole field of the
law regarding foreign currency obligations." Miliangos, 1976 A.C. at 467-68. He specifically
limited the decision to a claim for an agreed sum stated in a foreign currency (as distinct, for
example, from a claim for damages in tort or for breach of contract) and, further, to such a
claim under a contract governed by the law of a foreign country and providing that both the
money of account and the money of payment was that of a country other than the United
Kingdom. Id. The distinction between money of account and money of payment is one made
by Lord Denning M.R. in Woodhouse A.C. Israel Cocoa Ltd. v. Nigerian Produce Marketing
Co., where he stated: "The money of account is the currency in which an obligation is mea-
sured. It tells the debtor how much he has to pay. The money of payment is the currency in
which the obligation is to be discharged. It tells the debtor by what means he is to pay."
[1971] 2 Q.B. 23, 54 (C.A.),affid, 1972 A.C. 741 (H.L.) (emphasis in original).
17. Miliangos, 1976 A.C. at 465, 474-76, 497, 502-03.
18. Id. at 463.
19. [1898] 1 Ch. 581 (C.A.). The reason given for the home currency judgment rule was
that "such order cannot be enforced by the ordinary writs of execution." Id. at 587. This
procedural issue was resolved in Miliangos by acknowledging the form adopted by the Court of
Appeal which would order "that the defendant do pay to the plaintiff [the sum in foreign
currency] or the sterling equivalent at the time of payment." Miliangos, 1976 A. C. at 463. An
enforcement action on the judgment would then require "an affidavit showing the rate of ex-
change at the date of the application [for enforcement] and give the amount of the debt con-
verted into sterling at that date." Schorsch Meier GmbH v. Hennin, [1975] Q.B. 416, 426
(C.A.). The result would then be a judgment expressed in sterling in execution of the original
foreign currency judgment, with the date of execution exchange rate being applied.
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this country have no jurisdiction to order payment of money except in
the currency of this country,"20 and found that the breach date was the
appropriate time for determining the exchange rate for conversion. 21
Subsequent cases firmly established the sterling judgment and breach
date rules in English law.22
This bifurcated rule was found to apply whether the case concerned
the breach of a contract by failure to pay a foreign debt,2 3 breach of a
contract other than by failure to pay a foreign debt,24 or a tortious in-
jury.25 Cases generally did not draw any distinction between whether the
value of sterling had risen or had fallen in relation to the foreign currency
involved.26 The implicit, though unadmitted, rationale for these rules
was largely administrative convenience. The courts considered the
chance of damages caused by currency fluctuation after the original date
of injury too remote to justify compensation.2 7 For Lord Sumner, in S.S.
Celia v. S.S. Volturno,28 the choice between currencies was analogous to
the interpretation of a foreign language. If all else in the case must be
interpreted to the English court as it existed at the date of injury, he
reasoned, so must the amount of currency be "interpreted" into "Eng-
lish" at that date.2 9
20. Manners v. Pearson & Son, [1898] 1 Ch. at 587. As the parties had agreed upon the
number of Mexican dollars due, it has been suggested that this part of the Manners decision
was no more than dictum. Miliangos, 1976 A.C. at 493 (Lord Cross).
21. Manners, [1898] 1 Ch. at 587.
22. See supra note 15. It should be noted that even though the only clear holding of the
Manners case results from the application of the rule requiring conversion of the foreign sum
to sterling at the exchange rate existing on the date of breach (the "breach date rule"), this rule
is generally considered to arise out of the rule requiring that judgment be rendered in sterling
(the "sterling judgment rule"). In other words, in order for the procedural (sterling judgment)
rule to be carried out, the court must select a substantive (breach date) rule to determine the
applicable exchange rate. See Private International Law Foreign Money Liabilities, LAW
COMMISSION WORKING PAPER No. 80 § 2.4-.5 (1981) [hereinafter cited as LAW COMMISSION
WORKING PAPER].
23. See United Railways, 1961 A.C. 1007.
24. See Di Fernando, [1920] K.B. 409.
25. See S.S. Celia v. S.S. Volturno ("The Volturno") 1921 A.C. 544, 548 (H.L.).
26. See H. McGREGOR, DAMAGES 479 (13th ed. 1972).
27. Di Fernando, [1920] K.B. at 415; The Volturno, 1921 A.C. at 559-60. See also H.
McGREGOR, supra note 26, at 478.
28. 1921 A.C. 544 (H.L.).
29. Id. at 558. Although The Volturno was a tort case, its analysis and principles have
been found relevant to subsequent contract cases. Lord Sumner stated:
The agreed numbers of lire are only a part of the foreign language in which the Court is
informed of the damage sustained, and, like the rest of the foreign evidence, must be
translated into English. Being a part of the description and definition of the damage, this
evidence as to lire must be understood with reference to the time when the damage ac-
crues, which it is used to describe.
Id. at 555.
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Re United Railways of the Havana and Regla Warehouses 30 was repre-
sentative of the cases of this era. Although the case involved a "sum of
money payable in foreign currency in a foreign country under an
instrument of which the proper law is a foreign law,"' 31 Viscount Si-
monds ruled that both the sterling judgment and breach date rules
applied. 32
The sterling judgment and breach date rules, crafted in an era when
British sterling was a strong world currency, predictably became subject
to criticism when sterling declined in value. In The Teh Hu,33 Japanese
salvage contractors recovered a Panamanian vessel from the mid-Pacific
under a Lloyd's standard form of salvage agreement which provided for
the salvors' remuneration to be fixed by arbitration in London. By the
time the arbitrators made their award, sterling had been devalued. De-
spite the fact that one party was thinking in terms of yen and the other in
dollars, the application of the breach date rule by the Court of Appeal
resulted in payment in devalued pounds. As Lord Denning pointed out
in dissent, "the shipowners pay less than they ought and the salvors re-
ceive less than they deserve."'34
With the adherence of a Court of Appeal majority to both the sterling
judgment and breach date rules, the Teh Hu case was indicative of the
pre-Miliangos emphasis on rules rather than underlying principles. With
sterling no longer a consistently strong currency, loyalty to the principles
30. 1961 A.C. 1007 (H.L.).
31. Id. at 1043.
32. Viscount Simonds' language in United Railways was definitive:
Admittedly, the claim must be for a sterling sum and the judgment must be in sterling.
It is established by authority binding on this House that a claim for damages for breach of
contract or for tort in terms of a foreign currency must be converted into sterling at the
rate prevailing at the date of breach or tortious act. . . . But, it was said, doubts had
been expressed whether the same rule applied where the claim arose from a failure to pay
a debt expressed in terms of foreign currency, and it was urged that, on principle, the
plaintiff should recover sterling at the rate prevailing at the date of judgment or, altema-
tively, at the date of the writ or other initiating step of the proceedings. To this it was
answered that, without undue refinement the two cases, damages and foreign debt (as I
will call a debt in foreign currency), could not be distinguished, that an action to recover a
foreign debt was on a sound analysis nothing else than an action for recovery of damages
for breach of a contract to deliver foreign currency, that there was ample authority, an-
cient and modem, for this proposition, and that, in any case, convenience demanded that
the same rule should obtain.
Id. This language added to the strong barrier of precedent facing the House of Lords when
Miliangos reached them.
33. [1970] P. 106 (C.A.).
34. [1970] P. at 123. Lord Denning's dissent has been cited as "[t]he first herald of a new
judicial approach to the sterling-breach-date rule." LAW COMMISSION WORKING PAPER,
supra note 22, § 2.7. He found the rule to be unsatisfactory in a world in which sterling was no
longer the most stable currency. As a result, he expressed the fear that the confidence of
merchants in the English legal system would be lost, for "once justice is denied, confidence is
lost. Once confidence is lost, it is hard to restore." [1970] P. at 127.
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that generated the sterling judgment and breach date rules should have
led to new rules which would adequately reflect those principles in light
of changed circumstances.
B. Disenchantment with the Rules
Prior to United Railways, English cases had all involved a rise in the
value of sterling in relation to the foreign currency.35 In these cases, the
injured party profited from the home currency judgment and breach date
rules. In United Railways, however, the rule was applied to a U.S. dollar
contract, and the U.S. creditor was forced to accept payment in sterling
converted at a rate prevalent nearly 20 years before the judgment was
given. 36 The years between breach and judgment had seen the pound
devalued from around $4 to approximately $2.80.37 The inequitable re-
sults that the rules created when the forum currency was weak were
termed "anomalous. . . artificial. . . [and] unjust, 38 and "unworthy of
a rational legal system."'39
Following United Railways, a number of departures from the sterling
judgment and breach date rules crept into English law. These departures
were fueled by piecemeal legislative change in direct response to serious
inequitable situations. This legislation provided for judgment date con-
version in cases involving the carriage of goods by air,4° payment date
conversion in cases involving carriage of goods by road4' and rail,42 and
judgments in foreign currencies in cases involving the recognition and
enforcement of arbitral awards43 and foreign judgments.44 Why Parlia-
ment chose a route of selective deviation from the established sterling
35. A. DicEY & J. MORRIS, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 892 (8th ed. 1967); H. MCGREGOR,
supra note 26, at 346. This was true of Di Fernando, [1920] 3 K.B. 409 (C.A.), and The
Volturno, 1921 A.C. 544 (H.L.), the leading cases that stabilized the sterling judgment and
breach date rules as to contract and tort, respectively.
36. United Railways, 1961 A.C. at 1009.
37. Id. The rule seems to have been applied, not because it was seen as fair or represented
the expression of important basic principles, but simply because it was the law. This feeling
was expressed by Lord Reid, who said, "[the rule] may in some cases be artificial, it may even
be unjust, but it has been accepted for a long time, it is clear and certain." Id. at 1048.
38. Id. at 1052-53 (Lord Reid).
39. F. MANN, THE LEGAL ASPECT OF MONEY 371 (3d ed. 1971). Other critics of the rule
include A. DICEY & J. MORRIS, supra note 35; A. NUSSBAUM, supra note 11, at 370; 3 E.
RABEL, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 29 (2d ed. 1958); M. WOLFF, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL
LAW 461 (2d ed. 1945).
40. Carriage by Air Act 1961, 9 & 10 Eliz. 2, c. 27, art. 22(5), sched. I.
41. Carriage of Goods by Roads Act 1965, 13 & 14 Eliz. 2, ch. 37, art. 27(2), sched. I.
42. International Convention and Additional Protocol Concerning the Carriage of Goods
by Rail 1961, art. 31(2), Brit. T.S. No. 67 (1965).
43. See Jugoslavenska Oceanska Plovidba v. Castle Investment Co., [1974] Q.B. 292
(C.A.), which held that a London arbitration award made in terms of U.S. dollars was valid
and enforceable without conversion into sterling. Authority for this result was found in the
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judgment and breach date rules is not clear. The choice having been
made, however, parties were met with differing results in analytically in-
distinguishable circumstances. 45
In 1967, the House of Lords ruled in Beswick v. Beswick 46 that a court
could order specific performance of an agreement to pay a sum of money
in sterling. This raised the possibility that a similar result could be
reached in a suit for an amount in a foreign currency. The time had
come for a clear revision of both the procedural sterling judgment rule
and the resulting substantive breach date rule.
C. Miliangos and its Progeny
In Miliangos v. George Frank (Textiles) Ltd.,47 the House of Lords
reconsidered the home currency judgment and breach date rules in the
context of a contract for yarn between a Swiss national and an English
company. The contract was governed by Swiss law and called for pay-
ment in Swiss francs to a Swiss bank. The injured Swiss seller initially
issued a writ claiming payment of the sterling equivalent of the contract
price at the breach date. Between that date and the date of the hearing,
however, sterling fell in value against the Swiss franc. The Swiss plaintiff
then obtained leave to amend the statement of claim so as to avoid both
the sterling judgment and breach date rules and to claim the amount due
him in Swiss francs. The defendants did not dispute liability but con-
tended that the plaintiff was not lawfully entitled to judgment for a sum
of money expressed in a foreign currency.
The trial court in Miliangos followed the House of Lords directives in
United Railways and held for the defendant, stating that an English court
Arbitration Act 1950, § 26, which enables a domestic arbitration axfard to be enforced "in the
same manner as a judgment or order to the same effect." Section 36(1) of the Arbitration Act
1950 provides for enforcement of a foreign arbitration award in the same manner as a domestic
award.
44. See East India Trading Co. v. Carmel Exporters and Importers Ltd., [1952] 2 Q.B. 439
(applying Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1933, § 2(2) to hold that date at
which foreign judgment was rendered is relevant date for conversion of foreign currency into
sterling).
45. An interesting rule developed in regard to payment of a debt during the proceedings in
English courts. In Societ6 des Hotels Le Touquet v. Cummings, [1922] 1 K.B. 451 (C.A.), it
was held that payment out-of-court of a debt expressed in a foreign currency, subject to foreign
law and payable abroad (in depreciated foreign currency), discharged the debt and required
dismissal of the action. A later case arising from a similar set of facts held that the defendant
cannot discharge the debt by a payment into court of an amount in foreign currency represent-
ing the reduced value of the amount in foreign currency. Madeleine Vionnet et Cie v. Wills,
[1940] 1 K.B. 72 (C.A.).
46. 1968 A.C. 58 (H.L.), affig [1966] Ch. 538, [1966] 3 W.L.R. 396 (C.A.).
47. 1976 A.C. 443.
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could grant judgment in sterling only.48 The Court of Appeal reversed.49
Following its own decision in Schorsch Meier GmbH v. Hennin5° - in
which the court, distinguishing United Railways, had held that an Eng-
lish court could give money judgment in a foreign currency when that
currency was the currency of the contract-the court held that the prin-
ciple of stare decisis compelled it to permit the foreign currency
judgment.
The five speeches5 l that Miliangos occasioned in the House of Lords
focused as much on whether the court had the authority and institutional
capability to change an existing rule of law,52 as on the rationale for the
home currency judgment rule itself. In dissent, Lord Simon argued that
the decision to abolish the home currency judgment rule should be made
by Parliament, which was better equipped to ascertain the consequences
of the change.5 3 Nevertheless, Lord Wilberforce, relying on a declaration
of the House of Lords in 1966,54 which allowed deviation from principles
of stare decisis to prevent injustice and to foster "the proper development
of the law,"'5 5 found that the home currency judgment rule no longer
served its original purpose. His speech, in which three of the remaining
four Lords concurred in the result,56 is a compelling indictment of the
home currency judgment rule.
48. [1975] Q.B. 487.
49. Id.
50. [1975] Q.B. 416 (C.A.). The Court of Appeal also based its decision on article 106 of
the EEC Treaty, 298 U.N.T.S. 3, which liberalizes currency payments between member states.
This basis for a holding was unanimously rejected in Miliangos, which did not involve another
EEC member country. Miliangos, 1976 A.C. at 465, 474-76, 497, 502-03.
51. The five speeches were made by Lord Wilberforce, Lord Simon of Glaisdale, Lord
Cross of Chelsea, Lord Edmund-Davies, and Lord Fraser of Tullybelton. 1976 A.C. at 443.
52. See id. at 460.
53. Id. at 470.
54. [1966] 1 W.L.R. 1234.
55. Id. The Declaration of 1966 allows deviation from strict adherence to the rule of stare
decisis by recognizing that "too rigid adherence to precedent may lead to injustice in a particu-
lar case and also unduly restrict the proper development of the law." Id.
56. Lord Cross of Chelsea, in Miliangos, after arguing that Manners included only dicta
that the sterling judgmbnt rule was controlling, asserted that the date of judgment should be
the earliest time for conversion, because until judgment is rendered, the defendant owed the
plaintiff a number of Swiss francs and not English pounds. Until judgment is rendered, no
liability expressed in sterling exists. Miliangos, 1976 A.C. at 497-98. Lord Edmund-Davies,
after stating, "respectful agreement with the reasons given by. . .Lord Wilberforce," empha-
sized the other rule by seeing the only real issue as the date of conversion and asserting that the
outcome did not weigh heavily on the sterling judgment rule. Id. at 498-501. Lord Fraser of
Tulleybelton, after also expressing agreement with Lord Wilberforce's reasoning, stated a pref-
erence for date-of-payment conversion before going on to say that "theory must yield to practi-
cal necessity to this extent that, if the judgment has to be enforced in this country, it must be
converted before enforcement. Accordingly I agree. . . that conversion should be at the date
when the court authorizes enforcement of the judgment in sterling." Id. at 841. Lord Simon
of Glaisdale dissented and would have dismissed the appeal. Id. at 815-32.
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Lord Wilberforce found four fresh legal considerations, strengthened
by equitable concerns that the creditor should receive full damages,5 7
which distinguished Miliangos from United Railways. First, Lord Wil-
berforce argued that the basis for Lord Reid's statement in United Rail-
ways-that the sterling judgment rule was "primarily procedural" 58-no
longer held true. In times of floating currencies, foreign currency dam-
age awards could be both more equitable and "procedurally workable."5 9
Second, Lord Wilberforce found that the instability of exchange rates
caused by the "floating" status of the "main world currencies" meant
that "the search for a formula to deal with it becomes urgent in the inter-
est of justice." 6 Third, citing London arbitration awards in foreign cur-
rencies and the accompanying trend of courts to uphold those awards, 61
Lord Wilberforce argued that there were no longer any "practical objec-
tions" to enforcement of such awards and that a situation in which a
different rule existed for arbitration awards than for judicial actions on
similar debts was intolerable.62 Finally, Lord Wilberforce found that the
1974 decision in The Halcyon the Great,63 in which the court held that
the sale of a ship pursuant to compulsory liquidation of the company
owning it could be made in dollars, compelled the conclusion "that the
courts can easily adapt their procedure so as to give effect to foreign
money claims in specie." 64
Discussion of these four legal developments was followed by three
"general observations." The first of these equitable considerations was
the idea that "justice demands that the creditor should not suffer from
fluctuations in the value of sterling. '65 Lord Wilberforce then cited
Beswick v. Beswick, 66 for the proposition that specific performance may
be ordered of an agreement to pay a sum of money expressed in sterling,
submitting that foreign currency is of a "more specific" character than
sterling,67 and, therefore, at least as suitable an object for specific per-
formance. Finally, he relied upon the 1966 declaration of the House of
Lords68 which recognized the power to depart from a previous decision.
57. Id at 465 ("justice demands that the creditor should not suffer from fluctuations in the
value of sterling.").
58. United Railways, 1961 A.C. at 1052.
59. Miliangos, 1976 A.C. at 463.
60. Id
61. See supra note 43.
62. Miliangos, 1976 A.C. at 464.
63. [1975] 1 W.L.R. 515 (Q.B.).
64. Miliangos, 1976 A.C. at 464.
65. Id. at 465.
66. 1968 A.C. 58 (H.L.).
67. Miliangos, 1976 A.C. at 467.
68. [1966] 1 W.L.R. 1234 (H.L.).
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Stating that such a departure "would not involve undue practical difficul-
ties, [and] that a new and more satisfactory rule is capable of being
stated," Lord Wilberforce declared that the Miliangos case "falls within
the terms of the declaration." 69
The Miliangos decision was specifically limited to cases for collection
of a debt where the money of account, the money payment, and the
"proper law" of the contract were that of a foreign country. 70 Its appli-
cation, however, could not be so confined. Lord Wilberforce's acknowl-
edgment that a period of floating currencies demands adjustment in
procedural rules,71 that the word "money" in judicial parlance must be
construed in today's world to include foreign currencies, 72 that certainty
is more likely obtained through judgment in a foreign currency than by
application of a rule which had been consistently applied for some 350
years,73 and that granting judgment in a foreign currency allows a court
to further all of these considerations in a manner which is most likely to
compensate fairly a plaintiff for the damage suffered, 74 demanded broad
application. In subsequent cases, the requirements that the money of
payment as well as the money of account be foreign,75 and that the con-.
tract be governed by foreign law,76 were dropped.
69. Miliangos, 1976 A.C. at 467.
70. Id. Lord Wilberforce specifically confined his "approval at the present time of a
change in the breach-date rule" to "obligations of a money character to pay foreign currency
arising under a contract whose proper law is that of a foreign country and where the money of
account and payment is that of that country, or possibly of some other country, but not of the
United Kingdom." Id. at 467. However, a strong inference that the rule was not intended to
be strictly limited is found in the statement that "[i]t is for the courts . . . to work out a
solution in each case best adapted to giving the injured plaintiff that amount in damages which
will most fairly compensate him for the wrong which he has suffered." Id. at 468.
71. Id. at 463.
72. Id. at 464.
73. Id. at 465.
74. Id. at 468.
75. See George Veflings Rederi A/S v. President of India, [1979] 1 All E.R. 380 (C.A.).
The court, per Lord Denning, held that it was a reasonable inference that the payment should
be in dollars, which was the money of account, even though no money of payment was pro-
vided for in the contract.
76. See Barclays Bank Int'l Ltd. v. Levin Bros. Bradford Ltd., [1976] 3 All E.R. 900
(Q.B.). Despite the fact that the contract was governed by English law, the court granted
judgment in U.S. dollars. See also Federal Commerce and Navigation Co. v. Tradex Export
S.A. ("The Martha Envoy"), [1977] Q.B. 324 (C.A.), rev'd on other grounds, 1978 A.C. 1,
[1977] 3 W.L.R. 126 (H.L.), where Lord Denning rejected the post-Miliangos Practice Direc-
tion language which ostensibly limits the power to grant foreign currency judgments to con-
tracts "governed by the law of some country outside the United Kingdom," Practice
Direction, [1976] 1 W.L.R. 83, and stated that "[o]nce it is recognized that judgment can be
given in a foreign currency, justice requires that it should be given in every case where the
currency of the contract is a foreign currency." The Martha Envoy, [1977] Q.B. at 342 (em-
phasis in original). In BP Exploration Co. (Libya) v. Hunt (No. 2), [1982] 1 All E.R. 925
(Q.B.), affid, [1982] 1 All E.R. 978 (C.A.), affld [1982] 1 All E.R. 986 (H.L.), the English
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Two cases merit special notice. In The Folias,77 the House of Lords
extended Miliangos to provide a foreign currency judgment for damages
for a breach of contract governed by English law. The French charterer
of a ship rented from a Swedish company brought suit for damages sus-
tained when the ship's refrigeration machinery malfunctioned while car-
rying a cargo of onions to Brazil. The French charterer had settled with
the Brazilian cargo receiver in Brazilian cruzeiros, which had been
purchased with French francs. Although the franc was neither the cur-
rency of account nor the currency of payment, the House of Lords ap-
proved the judgment against the Swedish vessel owner in francs. After
noting that the "essential question is what was the loss suffered,"'78 Lord
Wilberforce found that "it was reasonable to contemplate that the char-
terers, being a French corporation and having their place of business in
Paris, would have to use French francs to purchase other currencies to
settle claims arising under the bills of lading."'79
At the same time as the House of Lords extended the Miliangos rule to
breach of contract in the The Folias, it extended the rule to damages in
tort in The Despina R. 80 The Despina R., a Greek ship managed by a
company with headquarters in New York, was damaged in a collision
with another Greek ship off Shanghai. Temporary repairs were done in
Shanghai and paid for in renmimbi yuan. Further repairs were made in
Yokohama and paid for in Japanese yen, with permanent repairs being
made in Los Angeles and paid for in U.S. dollars. The managing com-
pany used a U.S. dollar account in New York for all the payments. Lord
Wilberforce first determined that judgment in sterling would be inappro-
priate as it "commits [the plaintiff] to the risk of changes in the value of a
currency with which he has no connection." He then considered both
"the expenditure currency" and "the plaintiff's currency", applying the
"principles of restitutio in integrum and that of the reasonable foresee-
ability of the damage sustained. ' 81
courts went so far as to grant judgment in U.S. dollars even where the contract was governed
by English law and did not set forth a money of account or payment.
77. Services Europe Atlantique Sud (SEAS) v. Stockholms Rederiaktiebolag SVEA ("The
Folias"), 1979 A.C. 685 (H.L.).
78. Id. at 702.
79. Id. In approving judgment in French francs, Lord Wilberforce rejected the possibility
of judgment in the currency of the contract (U.S. dollars), id. at 700-01, the currency of the
forum (British sterling), id. at 702, or the expenditure currency (Brazilian cruzeiros), id. at
696-97, 702-03.
80. Owners of the M.V. Eleftherotria v. Owners of the M.V. Despina R ("The Despina
R."), 1979 A.C. 685 (H.L.).
81. Id. at 697.
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Taken together, The Folias and The Despina R. go far in demonstrat-
ing the wisdom of moving away from the sterling judgment and breach
date rules.8 2 In both, the application of a sterling judgment rule would
have represented a wooden approach and would have failed to fulfill the
aim of damages-to place the plaintiff in "as good a position as that he
would have been in had [the tort not occurred or] the contract been per-
formed."' 83 Accomplishing this goal requires compensation for foresee-
able economic loss, including the loss from post-injury exchange rate
fluctuation.84
Miliangos and its progeny have recognized that, while the mechanical
sterling judgment and breach date rules may have achieved just results
when sterling was a strong world currency, this foundation for the rules
disappeared with the advent of floating currencies. Once the judicial
mind perceived that the rules no longer protected the reasonable eco-
nomic interests of the injured party, but rather allowed for the unjust
82. InThe Folias, tying a party to the sterling value of the loss at the breach date, when
sterling was experiencing a rapid decline in value, would not fairly compensate the plaintiff and
would provide the defendant with reason to simply prolong the litigation. In The Despina R.,
the only connection to England was the forum for dispute settlement. Neither of the parties
was doing business primarily in sterling, the repairs were not paid for in sterling, and the
accounts out of which the repairs were paid were not sterling accounts. Lord Wilberforce was
correct in looking beyond sclerotic rules on currency determination in awarding judgments
based upon "the normal principles which govern the assessment of damages in cases of tort,"
id. at 697, and "general principles of the law of contract. ..and restitutio in integrum." Id. at
700. The Despina R. rationale was further applied in a tort context in Hoffnan v. Sofaer,
[1982] 1 W.L.R. 1350 (Q.B.), where a U.S. plaintiff sued an English physician for personal
injuries. The court awarded general and special damages in U.S. dollars as the currency of the
loss and the currency with which the loss was most "closely linked." Id. at 1358. It awarded
damages for pain and suffering in British sterling because, said Talbot, J., "It would be quite
impossible for me, and I dare say for a good many other judges, to assess such a claim in
dollars." Hoffman, [1982] 1 W.L.R. at 1357.
83. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344(a), comment a (1981).
84. The importance of foreign currency judgments in the context of debt, breach of con-
tract, and tort claims by a single plaintiff is evident. Cases in which a number of parties have
claims against a single debtor with those claims denominated in more than one currency are
more problematic. In Re Dynamics Corporation of America, [1976] 2 All E.R. 669 (Ch. Div.),
a New York corporation doing business in England was subjected to compulsory winding-up
under the Companies Act 1948. The court rejected the dicta of Lords Wilberforce and Cross
in Miliangos that would apply the exchange rate "when the creditor's claim in terms of sterling
is admitted by the liquidator." Id. at 681 (quoting Miliangos, 1976 A.C. at 469). It then held
that conversion for all creditors would be made as of the date the winding-up order was issued
by the court. Id. at 684-85. The court thus avoided the confusion and complexity of looking
to different dates for different claims.
Similarly, in Re Lines Bros. Ltd., [1983] 1 Ch. 1, the date of payment dicta of Miliangos was
rejected in a case of voluntary liquidation. In selecting the exchange rate existing on the date
of the commencement of the winding-up, the court noted the need to compare "like. . .with
like," and to value the liquidation fund in sterling. Id. at 14 (Lawton, L.J.). The Miliangos
rationale that any further risk of fluctuation loss should be born by the debtor was rejected as
inapplicable where "[t]he sterling creditors are not in default vis-a-vis the foreign currency
creditors," and "[t]he company is the wrongdoer toward both the sterling and the foreign
currency creditors." Id. at 16 (Brightman, L.J.).
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enrichment of the defendant, the English courts found it relatively easy
to adjust rules which had prevailed for some three and a half centuries.
This recognition of commercial reality has left English law more consis-
tent with the law of most of its major trading partners.8 5 It is time now
for the United States to follow this lead and forego its position as one of
the last bastions of the procedural home currency judgment rule and the
substantive conversion rules that accompany it.86
85. Although Canada retains a statutory requirement that judgments be rendered in the
home currency, see Currency and Exchange Act, CAN. REV. STAT., ch. C-39, § 11 (1970), in
determining the date of conversion, the courts have considered themselves "free to adopt that
date which in [the court's] view 'avoids an injustice' and is 'in step with commercial needs.'"
Batavia Times Publishing Co. v. Davis, 88 D.L.R. 3d 144, 153 (Ont. High Ct. of Justice 1978).
In most cases, however, Canadian courts have held that original judgments in Canadian courts
require application of the breach date exchange rate, see, e.g., Gatineau Power Co. v. Crown
Life Ins. Co., [1945] 4 D.L.R. 1, and foreign judgments are generally converted at the date of
the Canadian judgment. See, e.g., Williams & Glyn's Bank v. Belkin Packaging Ltd., 18
B.C.L.R. 279 (1978); Batavia Times, 88 D.L.R. 3d 144; Court Order Enforcement Act, B.C,
REv. STAT., ch. 75, § 33 (1979). Although a payment date exchange rate has been at times
considered the most equitable result, it has been determined to be prevented by the language of
the Currency and Exchange Act. Batavia Times, 88 D.L.R. 3d at 153-54. But see LAW RE-
FORM COMMISSION OF BRmTISH COLUMBIA, REPORT ON FOREIGN MONEY LIABILITIES 60
(1983) (recommending payment date conversion) [hereinafter cited as LAW REFORM COMMIS-
SION].
In Ontario, legislation providing for a payment date conversion rate was adopted in 1984.
The Courts of Justice Act provides an interesting comparison with § 823 of the RESTATE-
MENT and the alternative proposed in this Article:
§ 131.-(1) Subject to subsections (3) and (4), where a person obtains an order to en-
force an obligation in a foreign currency, the order shall require payment of an amount in
Canadian currency sufficient to purchase the amount of the obligation in the foreign cur-
rency at a chartered bank in Ontario at the close of business on the first day on which the
bank quotes a Canadian dollar rate for purchase of the foreign currency before the day
payment of the obligation is received by the creditor.
(2) Where more than one payment is made under an order referred to in subsection (1),
the rate of conversion shall be the rate determined as provided in subsection (1) for each
payment.
(3) Subject to subsection (4), where, in a proceeding to enforce an obligation in a for-
eign currency, the court is satisfied that conversion of the amount of the obligation to
Canadian currency as provided in subsection (1) would be inequitable to any party, the
order may require payment of an amount in Canadian currency sufficient to purchase the
amount of the obligation in the foreign currency at a chartered bank in Ontario on such
other day as the court considers equitable in the circumstances.
(4) Where an obligation enforceable in Ontario provides for a manner of conversion to
Canadian currency of an amount in a foreign currency, the court shall give effect to the
manner of conversion in the obligation.
(5) Where a writ of seizure and sale or notice of garnishment is issued under an order
to enforce an obligation in a foreign currency, the day the sheriff, bailiff or clerk of the
court receives money under the writ or notice shall be deemed, for the purposes of this
section and any obligation referred to in subsection (4), to be the day payment is received
by the creditor.
Courts of Justice Act, Ont. Stat. ch. 11, § 131 (1984).
86. See F. Mann, supra note 11, at 399-400.
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III. The U.S. Law: The Home Currency Judgment Rule and the
Breach Date Judgment Date Framework for Analysis
A. Introduction
U.S. case law on foreign currency judgments, like that in England
prior to Miliangos, has been relatively static. Unlike its English counter-
part, however, it has not produced clear results. Uniform acceptance of
the assumption that U.S. courts can render judgment only in U.S. cur-
rency 7 has focused the controversy on the date for conversion to dollars.
The result is that damages awards are inconsistent, and the injured party
can never expect to be fully compensated.
The federal courts, based upon two opinions by Justice Holmes,"" have
viewed the conversion issue as a conflict of laws problem.8 9 As a general
rule, if a liability expressed in a foreign currency is payable in the U.S.,
federal courts will apply the exchange rate existing on the date of
breach.90 If, however, the same obligation is payable or the cause of ac-
tion arose in the foreign jurisdiction, the federal courts will apply the
exchange rate existing on the date the judgment is rendered.91 Some
87. See infra text accompanying notes 96-97.
88. Die Deutsche Bank filiale Nurenburg v. Humphrey, 272 U.S. 517 (1526); Hicks v.
Guinness, 269 U.S. 71 (1925).
89. See RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 423, 424 (1934). See also RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §144 (1971).
90. Hicks, 269 U.S. 71.
91. Deutsche Bank, 272 U.S. 517. In fact, the language of Justice Holmes' majority opin-
ion in Deutsche Bank never once spoke of the judgment day rate of exchange. Rather, he
spoke of "when the suit is brought," "before the suit is brought", and "at the moment. . . the
suit is brought." Id at 519, 520. In his dissent, Justice Sutherland took issue with using "the
date of judgment for determining the value." Id. at 523. The Attorney General of the United
States, responding to the Supreme Court's decision, specifically interpreted the case as holding
"that in calculating the amount of a decree in favor of the plaintiff upon a debt owing in marks
in Germany the rate of exchange as of the date the suit was brought should be adopted."
Letter from the Attorney General to the United States Attorney in San Francisco (Dec. 15,
1926), quoted in Jones, supra note 11, at 282. Despite the language used by Justice Holmes,
subsequent cases and commentators have generally cited Deutsche Bank for the judgment date
rule. See, eg., Tramontana v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense, 350 F.2d 468
(D.C. Cir. 1965), cert. denied sub nom. Tramontana v. Varig Airlines, 383 U.S. 943 (1966);
Tillman v. Russo Asiatic Bank, 51 F.2d 1023 (2d Cir. 1931); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 144 (1971); 5 S. WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 1410A (3d ed. 1957); 2
BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS 1341 (1935); C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF
DAMAGES 49 (1935). However, Jones effectively, rebuts any foundation for finding the judg-
ment day rationale in the Holmes opinion. See Jones, supra note 11.
Interestingly, the distinction now attributed to Justice Holmes in the Hicks and Deutsche
Bank cases was correctly anticipated by Judge Augustus N. Hand in two earlier cases. In The
Verdi, 268 F. 908 (S.D.N.Y. 1920), a claim arose from the collision of two ships in New York
Harbor. Even though the repairs were made in England and paid for in English pounds, Judge
Hand applied the exchange rate existing on the date of the wrong since the tort was committed
in the United States. In The Hurona, 268 F. 911 (S.D.N.Y. 1920), Judge Hand held that an
advance of 119,000 French francs made and repayable in Marseilles was recoverable at the
judgment date rate of exchange.
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state courts have followed the federal rule while others have adopted a
single breach date conversion rule attributed primarily to New York.92
Under Erie,93 federal courts in diversity cases apply the state law rule.94
The result is conflicting analytical foundations between the state and fed-
eral courts, a bifurcated breach date/judgment date rule when Justice
Holmes' federal court analysis is applied, and general confusion when an
attempt is made to come up with a rational statement of the law which
will serve some predictive function.
This section will examine the validity of the present home currency
judgment rule. The new foreign currency judgment rule proposed by the
Restatement (Revised) of Foreign Relations Law raises questions about
the status of U.S. law.95 A review of the history of the language of the
courts and Congress also casts doubt on whether a valid foundation for
the home currency judgment rule ever existed. Once the myth that judg-
ment must be rendered in U.S. currency is exposed, the following sec-
tions will address the problems of state laws and conversion dates that
are intertwined with the home currency judgment rule and not solved by
the Restatement.
92. The breach date rule was adopted by the New York Court of Appeals in Hoppe v.
Russo-Asiatic Bank, 235 N.Y. 37, 138 N.E. 497 (1927). But see Perutz v. Bohemian Discount
Bank in Liquidation, 279 A.D. 386, 110 N.Y.S.2d 446 (1952) (deviation from strong breach
date rule permitted for entry of judgment based on party stipulation). For a more recent
statement of the New York development of this rule, see De Sayve v. De La Valdene, 124
N.Y.S.2d 143, 154-56 (Sup. Ct. 1953).
93. Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
94. See, eg., Vishipco Line v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 660 F.2d 854, 865-66 (2d Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 976 (1982); Compania Engraw Commercial E. Industrial S.A. v.
Schenley Distillers Corp., 181 F.2d 876, 879 (9th Cir. 1950).
95. RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 823 (Tent. Draft No. 6,
1985). Section 823 represents a revision of § 853 of Tent. Draft No. 5, 1984. As proposed, the
new § 823 reads as follows:
§ 823. Obligations in Foreign Currency: Law of the United States
(1) Courts in the United States ordinarily give judgment on causes of action arising in
another state, or denominated in a foreign currency, in United States dollars, but they are
not precluded from giving judgment in the currency in which the obligation is denomi-
nated or the loss was incurred.
(2) If the court gives judgment in dollars in accordance with Subsection (1), the con-
version is to be made at such rate as to make the creditor whole and to avoid rewarding a




B. The Home Currency Judgment Rule as Federal Law: Pulling Up
the Shallow Roots
Both courts and commentators have considered it "well settled that a
money judgment by an American court must be in American cur-
rency."' 96 Nevertheless, the rule's origin is obscure. Most cases and com-
mentators stating this rule support it with citations to earlier cases that
have made the same naked statement.97 Others contend that section 20
of the Currency Act of 179298 supports such a rule.99 Upon analysis,
however, neither the statute nor the case law requires that U.S. courts
give judgment only in U.S. currency.
1. The Statute
The purported basis for the home currency judgment rule is section 20
of the Currency Act of 1792, which, until September 1982, stated:
The money of account of the United States shall be expressed in dollars
or units, dimes or tenths, cents or hundredths, and mills or thousandths, a
dime being the tenth part of a dollar, a cent the hundredth part of a dollar,
a mill the thousandth part of a dollar; and all accounts in the public offices
and all proceedings in the courts shall be kept and had in conformity to this
regulation. 10
Despite the Currency Act's apparent unconcern for court procedure,
some courts read this language to require them to render judgments in
U.S. currency.101
In September 1982 Congress revised this provision, "without substan-
tive change," 102 to read as follows: "United States money is expressed in
dollars, dimes or tenths, cents or hundredths, and mills or thousandths.
A dime is a tenth of a dollar, a cent is a hundredth of a dollar, and a mill
96. Shaw, Savill, Albion & Co. v. The Fredricksburg, 189 F.2d 952, 954 (2d Cir. 1951).
97. See, e.g., Jamaica Nutrition Holdings v. United States, 643 F.2d 376 (5th Cir. 1981);
International Silk Guild, Inc. v. Rogers, 262 F.2d 219, 224 (D.C. Cir. 1958); Frontera Trans-
port Co. v. Albaunza, 271 F. 199, 202 (5th Cir. 1921); B.V. Bureau Wijsmuller v. United
States, 487 F. Supp. 156, 176 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), affld, 633 F.2d 202 (2d Cir. 1980); Liberty
Nat'l Bank v. Burr, 270 F. 251, 252 (E.D. Pa. 1921); Fraenkel, supra note 11, at 360; Note,
The Need to Retreat From Inflexible Conversion Rules-An Equitable Approach to Judgment in
Foreign Currency, supra note 11, at 871.
98. Currency Act of 1792, supra note 4.
99. See, e.g., Baumlin & Ernst, Ltd. v. Gemini, Ltd., 637 F.2d 238, 244 n.9 (4th Cir. 1980);
International Silk Guild, 262 F.2d at 224; The Fredricksburg, 189 F.2d at 954-55.
100. 31 U.S.C. § 371 (1982).
101. See supra note 99.
102. Pub. L. 97-258, 96 Stat. 877, 1067 (1982). Section 4 of this Act states that the Act's
provisions, "restate, without substantive change, laws enacted before April 16, 1982, that were
replaced by those sections." Id.
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is a thousandth of a dollar. °10 3 While the views of a subsequent Con-
gress do not override the unmistakable intent of the enacting Con-
gress,104 they are entitled to weight, particularly when the precise intent
of the enacting Congress is not entirely clear.105 Congress believed in
1982 that the "money of account" language and the provision that "all
accounts in the public offices and all proceedings in the courts shall be
kept and had in conformity to this regulation" were surplusage. 10 6 The
combination of this belief and the weak historical support for the home
currency judgment rule indicates that the rule was never well-founded.
The historical record supports this legislative judgment. In the exten-
sive discussion of the Currency Act by such figures as Thomas Jefferson
and Alexander Hamilton, no mention is made of the procedure of the
courts.10 7 The primary purposes of the Currency Act were to establish
103. 31 U.S.C.A. § 5101 (West Supp. 1984). In recodifying this provision, the word
"money" was "substituted for 'money of account' to eliminate unnecessary words." H. REP.
No. 651, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 146, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1895j
2040. The words "of account" were determined to be without special meaning in light of
Alexander Hamilton's interchangeable use of the phrases "money unit of the United States"
and "money of account." Id at 2040 (citing A. HAMILTON, REPORT ON THE ESTABLISH-
MENT OF THE MINT (1791)). The deletion of the "of account" language comports with the
view of one leading commentator who has said that, "the phrase 'money of account' ought
definitely to be avoided in a discussion aspiring to scientific accuracy." A. NUSSBAUM, supra
note 11, at 15-16.
104. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 354 & n.39 (1977)
(views of a subsequent Congress "form a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an earlier
one").
105. See United States v. Price, 361 U.S. 304, 313 (1960) (views of a subsequent Congress
"entitled to significant weight"). See also Seatrain Shipbldg. Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 444 U.S.
572, 596 (1980).
106. H.R. Rep. No. 651, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 146-47 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 1895, 2041.
107. Section 20 of the Currency Act of 1792 was the final section of the Act, and the
language in question was the final phrase of that section. It is a phrase which has no founda-
tion in the writings of the principal parties involved in its creation. Resolutions of the Conti-
nental Congress of July 6, 1785, and August 8, 1786, each declared "the money unit of the
United States" to be the dollar and further provided for the adoption of a decimal system of
coinage. Resolution of 6 July 1785, reprinted in XXIX JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL
CONGRESS 1774-1789, at 499-503 (1933); Resolution of 8 August 1786, reprinted in XXXI
JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774-1789, at 503 (1933). No mention is made
in either of these resolutions to a relationship between the resolution and procedure in U.S.
courts. The statute addressed the unit which would become the currency for the states and the
preparations for the creation of a national mint. Resolution of 6 July 1785, supra; Resolution
of 8 August 1786, supra. See also Report of Robert Morris to the President of Congress, 15
January 1782, reprinted in 7 PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 160 (J. Boyd ed. 1953); T. Jeffer-
son, Notes on Coinage, reprinted in 7 PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON at 175.
The discussions of Robert Morris and Thomas Jefferson were further developed by Alexan-
der Hamilton in his capacity as Secretary of the Treasury after the adoption of the Constitu-
tion. See A. Hamilton, Final Version of the Report on the Establishment of a Mint (1791),
reprinted in 7 PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 570 (H. Syrett ed. 1963). In his Report,
Hamilton listed six "particulars required to be discussed." While one of Hamilton's six "par-
ticulars" for the Treasury was whether foreign coins should be permitted to be "current," id.
at 572, his concern was with the establishment of a domestic form of currency and not with its
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the coin of the United States, choose the decimal system for determining
fractions of that coin, and create a national mint.10 8
2. The United States Case Law
The rule that a federal court may not grant a judgment in a foreign
currency has a long heritage.109 Foreshadowed by two opinions of Jus-
tice Chase in 1869,110 the rule was clearly accepted in two seminal opin-
ions by Justice Holmes,"1 and it has since become orthodoxy for the
federal courts. 112 The rule has been accepted so routinely that most
courts expressing it have not considered the possibility of granting judg-
ment in a foreign currency. Consequently, the cases provide no more
reasoned support for the home currency judgment rule than does section
20 of the Currency Act of 1792.
The two opinions of Chief Justice Chase that provide the genesis of
current rationale for the home currency judgment rule in U.S. case law
use in the courts. Id. at 604-05. There exists, as far as this author can determine, no explana-
tion of the addition of the phrase, "and that all accounts in the public offices, and all proceed-
ings in the Courts of the United States shall be kept and had in conformity to this regulation,"
in the Currency Act of 1792 to the language previously used in the Resolutions of the Conti-
nental Congress of July 6, 1785 and August 8, 1976. As such, Congress appears to have been
correct in 1982 when it found this language to have been "surplus." H.R. Rep. No. 651, supra
note 106. The "money of account" term appears simply to have been considered in 1792 to
have been synonymous with the phrase "money unit of the United States" which had been
used in the Continental Congress Resolutions of July 6, 1785, and August 8, 1786. It appears
in no way to have been considered analogous to the currency of account--currency of payment
distinction considered so important by the English courts in dealing with the foreign currency
judgments issue. See supra note 16.
108. See supra note 107.
109. It has been suggested that the home currency judgment rule in Anglo-American law
is a result of the fact that, in the Middle Ages, when a "creditor had a choice between two
actions; he could sue the debtor for the foreign money in 'debt in the detinet', or in the ordi-
nary action of debt for its equivalent in English money." A. NUSSBAUM, supra note 11, at 365.
In the action for debt in the detinet, the creditor was entitled to specific recovery of that which
the debtor was obligated under the contract to provide. 1 REEVES, ENGLISH LAW 159 (1814);
see also Rands v. Peck, 79 Eng. Rep. 527 (1622). Once this action became obsolescent, the
only alternative available became to sue in debt for the home currency equivalent of the foreign
currency, thereby requiring conversion at some applicable rate. Civil law courts have tradi-
tionally held judgments in foreign currency to be lawful and have preferred specific perform-
ance to home currency damages. See A. NUSSBAUM, supra note 11, at 374-76; F. MANN,
supra note 11, at 339-40. This preference for specific performance is reflected in the United
Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, which was adopted in
1980. U.N. DOC. A/CONF. 97/18, Annex I, arts. 46(1), 63(1) (1980). Should the United
States ratify the Convention, we may at that time have come full circle in the process, at least
as regards international transactions.
110. Butler v. Horwitz, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 258 (1869); Bronson v. Rodes, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.)
229 (1869). Cases prior to these had been primarily concerned with the distinction between
the statutorily established par of exchange and the market rate of exchange. See infra note
127.
111. Die Deutsche Bank filiale Nurenburg v. Humphrey, 272 U.S. 517 (1926); Hicks v.
Guinness, 269 U.S. 71 (1925).
112. See supra notes 96-97.
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are seldom cited today. Rather than supporting the home currency judg-
ment rule, however, they stand for the proposition that the result should
"give full effect to the intention of the parties as to the medium of pay-
ment." 113 In Bronson v. Rodes,114 the Court considered the effect of the
Legal Tender Act 1 5 on a loan in gold and silver coin made prior to its
passage. In a context directly analogous to foreign currency exchange,
the Court rejected the plaintiff's attempt to pay his debt in the devalued
currency of the forum-the U.S. dollar. 116 While in dicta it found that
payment generally should be made in paper notes when the contract
specified payment in dollars, the Court held that when the contract spe-
cifically required payment "in coin," judgment must be entered in
"coined dollars and parts of dollars."1 17 The tender of the nominal
amount due in United States notes was rejected as insufficient, and judg-
ment was ordered for the amount due in gold or silver coin.' 18
The Supreme Court faced a similar issue shortly thereafter in Butler v.
Horwitz.19 A ninety-nine year lease entered on February 18, 1791,
called for rent in the "sum of £15, current money of Maryland, payable
in English golden guineas. . . and other gold and silver at their present
established weight."' 120 Following Bronson, the court held that payment
was due in gold and silver coin because the "obvious intent of the con-
tract. . . was to secure payment of a certain rent in gold and silver, and
thereby avoid the fluctuations to which the currency of the country, in
the days which preceded and followed the establishment of our indepen-
dence, had been subject, and also all future fluctuations."' 21 However, as
the parties were agreed that £15 was equal to $40 in gold and silver, the
Court did not consider granting judgment in English currency. 22
The proposition that Bronson and Butler establish a foundation for a
home currency judgment rule is belied by the specific language of Butler.
After determining that payments in coin could be considered an assess-
ment of lawful money permissible in U.S. courts, the Court held that the
113. Bronson, 74 U.S. at 261.
114. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 229 (1869).
115. Act of 25 February 1862, ch. 33, 12 Stat. 345.
116. Bronson, 74 U.S. at 229. The documentation on the loan called for payment in gold
or silver, the medium in which all currency at the time of the contract was redeemable. See
Rodes v. Bronson, 34 N.Y. 649 (1866). Plaintiff in 1865 tendered United States notes in the
amount of $1,507 in payment of a debt incurred in 1851. The defendant refused the payment
in notes because, although it was nominally equal to the principal due on the bond and mort-
gage involved, gold and silver dollars, the original currency of account, were equivalent in
value to $2.25 in United States notes.
117. Bronson, 74 U.S. at 254.
118. Id. at 255.
119. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 258 (1869).






intent of the parties would govern on the issue of currency of judgment.
It stated:
We are of the opinion, therefore, that under the existing law, of which, in
respect to legal tender, the constitutionality is, we repeat, in this case, as-
sumed, damages may be properly assessed and judgments rendered, so as to
give full effect to the intention of parties as to the medium of payment.
When, therefore, it appears to be the clear intent of a contract that payment
or satisfaction shall be made in gold and silver, damages should be assessed
and judgment rendered accordingly.1 23
When the language of Bronson v. Rodes and Butler v. Horwitz is ap-
plied to contracts or other obligations for which liability is denominated
in terms of a foreign currency, the result is not entirely clear. Neither
Bronson nor Butler squarely held that a U.S. court cannot give judgment
in a foreign currency. That issue was not before the court in either
case.124 These cases can best be summarized as holding that U.S. courts
were able to give judgment in either coin or note, and when a contract
specifically called for payment in coin, judgment was required to be in
coin. 125
The cases generally cited for the home currency judgment rule are
Hicks v. Guinness126 and Deutsche Bank.'27 Moreover, although Justice
123. Id. at 261. Bronson "in fact upholds the freedom of contract between parties to de-
fine, as between themselves, a standard of value". Id. See also Eder, supra note 11, at 68.
124. Although the Court in Butler might have considered judgment in English golden
guineas, it implicitly chose not to do so.
125. Although one might interpret the Bronson and Butler dicta as authority for the prop-
osition that the legal tender statutes, even without section 20 of the Currency Act of 1792,
require that U.S. courts render judgments in U.S. currency, to do so would not only be con-
trary to the more specific language of Butler but would also be antithetical to the Supreme
Court's own language in the more directly applicable cases. The current legal tender statute
provides that "[f]oreign gold or silver coins are not legal tender for debts." 31 U.S.C. § 5103
(1982). In Hicks v. Guinness, 269 U.S. 71, 80 (1925), when faced with almost identical lan-
guage in the predecessor statute, the Court did not once question the right of the parties to
contract for a debt in German marks payable in the United States.
126. 269 U.S. 71 (1925).
127. 272 U.S. 517 (1925). The fact that these cases arose in the 1920's does not mean that
the issue had not been faced in U.S. courts prior to that time. However, earlier American cases
provide little guidance in determining a contemporary rule, largely because they approached
the problem, not from the point of view of either the possibility of granting judgment in a
foreign currency or of the date on which the foreign currency was to be valued, but instead by
discussing whether the par of exchange or the rate of exchange was to be applied for valuation
purposes. See, e.g., Grant v. Healey, 10 F. Cas. 978, 979 (C.C.D. Mass. 1839) (No. 5696).
From 1793 until 1857, and again after 1873, Congress periodically enacted statutes which set
the value of foreign currencies for specific purposes. See Act of Feb. 9, 1793, 1 Stat. 300
(1793); Act of March 3, 1873, 17 Stat. 603 (1873); King v. Hamilton, 12 F. 478 (C.C.D. Or.
1882); Fraenkel, supra note 11, at 361 nn. 6-7. Since 1894, statutory determination of the
value of foreign coins has been based upon metal content, with values for conversion in the
collection of duties on imports set by the Secretary of the Treasury or determined at the mar-
ket buying rate as certified by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Act of Aug. 27, 1894,
ch. 349, § 25, 28 Stat. 552 (1894), codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. § 5151 (1982). It was
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Holmes in these cases found that judgments in United States courts must
be rendered in U.S. currency, his decisions were not based upon any stat-
utory or judicial precedent. His analysis simply accepted the restriction
in the course of developing a method for determining the date at which
conversion should be made. In Hicks, Justice Holmes held that an
American creditor of a German firm was entitled to payment of the full
dollar value of the Deutsch marks it was owed as of the date the debt
became due. Accepting counselor's argument that a U.S. court could
only grant judgment in U.S. dollars,128 the Court held that as the debt
became due in the United States, it should be converted into dollars on
the date it became due. 129 In Deutsche Bank, on the other hand, the
Court limited the plaintiff's recovery to the dollar value of his German
debt at the date of judgment. As the plaintiff's obligation was solely a
German one,' 30 there was no U.S. dollar obligation until the United
States judgment was rendered.131
The logic behind Holmes' opinions, in contrast to his language, pro-
vides further support for the argument that judgment may be granted in
a foreign currency. The consideration motivating Holmes' analysis was
that an injured party should not receive a more favorable judgment sim-
ply by virtue of the forum in which the suit was brought. An obligation,
he stated in Deutsche Bank, should not be "enlarged by the fact that the
creditor happens to be able to catch his debtor [in the United States]. ' 132
Logically then, the goal in awarding a foreign currency judgment, of pro-
viding the same result as would have been reached in a foreign court,
dictates that judgment be granted in a foreign currency. Thus, rather
than providing added support for the home currency judgment rule,
often contended that the courts should apply the statutory rates for all purposes, Butte v.
Hoge, 2 Hilt. 81, 83 (N.Y. 1858); Purviance v. Neave, 4 H. & McH. 199, 204-05 (C.A. 1798),
but was ultimately determined that the value of foreign money was to be determined by the
facts of the case rather than by legislative directive. Robinson v. Hall, 28 How. Pr. 342 (N.Y.
1864); Guiteman v. Davis, 3 Daly 120 (N.Y. 1869). In the earlier cases of Martin v. Franklin,
4 Johns. 124 (N.Y. 1809), Scofield v. Day, 20 Johns. 102 (N.Y. 1822), Adams v. Cordis, 25
Mass. 260 (1829), and Alcock v. Hopkins, 60 Mass. 484 (1850), par was used as the measure of
value, generally without reference to any statute. In Grant v. Healey, 3 Sumn. 523 (C.C.D.
Mass. 1839), Justice Story used an earlier version of Justice Holmes' choice of law analysis to
declare that par of exchange was to govern a bill payable in the U.S., whereas rate of exchange
would govern if the bill were payable abroad. All of these cases assumed application of the
judgment date or trial date rate of exchange. The par of exchange versus rate of exchange
distinction means that most early cases are relatively useless today, at least as far as the narrow
holdings are concerned.
128. 269 U.S. at 80.
129. Id.
130. 272 U.S. at 517. Plaintiff had deposited money on demand in a German bank which
defaulted on the obligation.
131. Id. at 519.
132. Id. at 517.
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Holmes' choice of law analysis provides a rationale for granting foreign
currency judgments in U.S. courts. In fact, the language of Chief Justice
Chase in Butler, that "damages may be properly assessed and judgments
rendered, so as to give full effect to the intention of the parties as to the
medium of payment," 133 combined with Holmes' observation that our
courts ought to enforce the same obligation as exists under the foreign
law applicable to a claim, leads to the logical result that judgment should
be granted in a foreign currency where the facts support a foreign cur-
rency claim.
IV. The Move for Change in the United States: Disenchantment with
Our Rules
A. Comparisons with the English Rule
The move to a foreign currency judgment rule in the U.S. has been
retarded by the strong position of the dollar relative to other curren-
cies134 and the flexibility the Holmesian analysis provides to courts strug-
gling to avoid inequitable results.1 35 By capitalizing on the lack of clarity
in the conversion rules,1 36 United States courts have "endeavored to se-
lect the rule that, in a given case, will prevent the loss from fluctuation of
exchange rates from being borne by the injured or non-breaching
party."1 37 Nevertheless, events analogous to those in England prior to
133. Butler, 74 U.S. at 261.
134. See, e.g., The Dollar's Performance Since 1973, N.Y. Times, Sept. 24, 1985, at A49,
col. 4. Notable exceptions to the general strength of the dollar include the efforts of the Nixon
and Reagan Administrations in 1971 and 1985, respectively, to force down the value of the
dollar. See 7 WEEKLY COMp. PREs. Doc. 1168 (1971); Dollar Plunges to 16-Month Low in
Reaction to 5 Nations'Accord, N.Y. Times, Sept. 24, 1985, at Al, col. 4. In 1978-81, market
forces worked to depress the value of the dollar. The Dollar's Performance Since 1973, supra.
135. Although much confusion has been generated in U.S. courts by decisions which have
vacillated between the breach date and the judgment date rates of exchange, the lack of clarity
in the decisions has generally allowed a court to construct an opinion which allows it to select
what it believes is the most equitable of the two possible results, and even to vary the definition
of the dates of breach and judgment. See, e.g., In Re Good Hope Chemical Corp., 747 F.2d
806 (1st Cir. 1984). Even if a court concludes that a judgment in foreign currency would
produce the most equitable result (the equivalent of a payment date conversion rate), it can
avoid the harshness of a breach date ruling and select the judgment date as the applicable date
for determining the exchange rate, thereby coming closer to the desired result than would have
been possible in a pre-Miliangos English court.
136. See supra note 135, infra notes 217-18.
137. RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 823, Reporter's Note 4
(Tent. Draft No. 6, 1985). Compare Jamaica Nutrition Holdings, Ltd. v. United Shipping Co.,
643 F.2d 376, 381 (5th Cir. 1981) ("We see no reason to place the risk of devaluation on (or to
grant the possibility of profit by appreciation to) the injured party.") and Skibs A/S Gylfe v.
S/T Trujillo, 1954 A.M.C. 233, 236 (2d Cir. 1954) ("It is fairer to put the risk of fluctuation of
foreign exchange on the tortfeasor than on the innocent injured party.") with Die Deutsche
Bank filiale Nurnberg v. Humphrey, 272 U.S. 517, 519 (1926) ("An obligation in terms of the
currency of a country takes the risk of currency fluctuations and whether creditor or debtor
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Miliangos presage the demise of the home currency judgment rule. 138
The new section 823 of the Restatement 139 indicates dissatisfaction with
existing rules. In addition, other developments have echoed the English
precursors of the Miliangos rule.
1. Revision of the Currency Act
As already mentioned, 140 the 1982 revision of section 20 of the Cur-
rency Act of 1792 eliminated the provision that proceedings in court be
kept in conformity with regulations establishing the U.S. dollar as the
national currency. Section 20 is now clear in this regard. It establishes
the dollar as the currency of the United States and does not purport to
determine court procedure. Thus, while at one time section 20 might
have been interpreted to support the proposition that judgments must be
rendered in U.S. currency, the 1982 revision has removed this possibil-
ity.141 There is no longer any statutory support for the home currency
judgment rule.
profits by the change the law takes no account of it.") See also B.V. Bureau Wijsmuller v.
United States, 487 F. Supp. 156 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), afl'd, 633 F.2d 202 (2d Cir. 1980) (a Dutch
salvor of a U.S. Navy vessel was awarded an "equitable uplift" in order to compensate for a
decline in the value of the dollar relative to Dutch guilder from the time of salvage to the date
of judgment); Librarie Hachette v. Paris Book Center, Inc., 62 Misc. 2d 873, 309 N.Y.S.2d 701
(Sup. Ct. 1970) (where the court ruled that the equities favored application of the breach date
rule when a U.S. purchaser failed to pay French francs for books received from a French
publisher and the French franc had declined in value against the dollar); A. NUSSBAUM, supra
note 11, at 406 ("Civil law courts exhibit a tendency to throw the risk of depreciation of the
money of damages upon the wrongdoer.").
Cornel Watch, S.A. v. Peterson State Bank, 565 F. Supp. 259 (N.D. Ill. 1983), is the only
U.S. case to have flatly rejected the argument that "it is fairer to put the risk of fluctuation of
foreign exchange on the tortfeasor than on the innocent party." Id. at 263. The case involved
a contract for the delivery of Swiss watches in Illinois, with payment in Swiss francs.
Although the dollar had declined in value during the period between the breach and the judg-
ment, the court applied the breach date rule. In so doing, it stated that, "[w]hile in the past,
the rate of exchange prevailing at the date of breach did predominantly favor the plaintiff, this
fact does not appear to be a significant reason for the court's choice of a breach-date rule." Id.
at 262. See generally Note, The Need to Retreat From Inflexible Conversion Rules-An Equita-
ble Approach to Judgment in Foreign Currency, supra note 11, at 875.
138. See supra notes 41-46 and accompanying text.
139. RE TATEMENT (REvISED) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 823 (Tent. Draft No. 6,
1985).
140. See supra notes 98-108 and accompanying text.
141. Although the omission of language from a statute by a subsequent legislature may not
be probative of the intent of the enacting legislature, courts have in the past used the omission
of language, even though accidental, to free themselves from a rule they viewed as inconsonant
with judicial imperatives. Cf Freeman v. United States, 243 F.2d 353 (9th Cir. 1917), cert.
denied, 249 U.S. 600 (1919) (omission of language from the Judiciary Act of 1891 construed to
preclude appeal of sentences which would be impracticable).
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2. Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards
U.S. ratification in 1970 of the United Nations Convention on the Rec-
ognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards1 42 gives the fed-
eral courts power over the determination of a foreign currency claim
similar to the authority exercised by the British courts under the 1950
Arbitration Act.' 43 The Convention and its implementing legislation ' 44
make enforcement of foreign arbitral awards a question arising under
federal law, regardless of the amount in controversy.1 45 Under Article
III of the Convention, each Contracting State is required to "recognize
arbitral awards as binding and enforce them in accordance with the rules
of procedure of the territory where the award is relied upon." 146 A
United States court with jurisdiction will "confirm the award," unless
certain grounds for refusal or deferral of recognition are found.147
Prior to the ratification of the Convention, courts had held that, "[a]n
arbitration award in this country, like the decision of a court, must direct
payment in dollars."1 48 However, several cases subsequent to ratification
imply that "confirmation" of an award in a foreign currency would be
permissible.' 49 Such cases demonstrate that enforcement of an arbitral
award rendered outside the United States in a foreign currency is not too
administratively costly. The requirement that arbitral awards rendered
in the United States must be rendered in U.S. dollars, like its counterpart
in the judgment context, is no longer supportable and should be
rejected.' 50
142. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June
10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force for the United
States Dec. 29, 1970) [hereinafter cited as New York Convention].
143. See supra notes 43, 61-62, and accompanying text. Lord Wilbefforce found the prece-
dent of arbitral awards enforced in a foreign currency persuasive in Miliangos. 1976 A.C. at
464.
144. United States Arbitration Act, Title II, Act of July 31, 1970, 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-08
(1982).
145. Id. § 203.
146. New York Convention, supra note 142, art. III.
147. 9 U.S.C. § 207 (1982).
148. See, eg., Application of United Shellac Corp., 277 A.D. 147, 148, 97 N.Y.S.2d 817,
822 (1950).
149. See, eg., Island Territory of Curacao v. Solitron Devices, Inc., 356 F. Supp. 1
(S.D.N.Y. 1973), affid, 489 F.2d 1313 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 986 (1974) (enforc-
ing an arbitral award "for 445,682.35 Netherlands Antilles guilder, to be converted into
United States dollars at the rate prevailing on the date of judgment"); Waterside Ocean Navi-
gation Co. v. Int'l Navigation Ltd., 737 F.2d 150 (2d Cir. 1984) (upholding judgment in which
an arbitral award rendered in London was confirmed "in the sum of $1,634,442.33 and 15,754
pound sterling"); Fertilizer Corp. of India v. IDI Management, Inc., 517 F. Supp. 948 (S.D.
Ohio 1981), reconsideration denied, 530 F. Supp. 542 (S.D. Ohio 1982) (indicating that award
of 9,679,000 Indian rupees could be rendered in U.S. courts). These cases parallel the Jugos-
lavenska decision in England. See supra note 43.
150. See infra text accompanying notes 225-59.
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3. Enforcement of Foreign Judgments
Prior to Miliangos, English courts provided some movement away
from a strict breach date conversion rule by interpreting the 1933 For-
eign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act to hold that conversion in
an action enforcing a foreign judgment would be made at the date on
which the foreign judgment was rendered, and not the original breach
date.1 51 Similarly, the Second Circuit has held that, under New York
law, which follows a strict breach date conversion rule, the conversion
date in a foreign judgment enforcement action is the date on which the
judgment was rendered in the foreign jurisdiction. 152 In each case the
court expressed concern for the inequities of a strict breach date conver-
sion rule, but determined that adherence to such a rule was required,15 3
and then constructed a holding which provided for equitable modifica-
tion of the rule.
4. Recognition of Foreign Law in Awarding Pre-Judgment Interest
Although the amount of interest due on a judgment is often considered
a secondary issue, it is important in the context of currency exchange
rate fluctuations.1 54 Interest rates often represent an important compo-
nent of the exchange rate equation.155 Recent United States decisions
151. See, e.g., East India Trading Co. v. Carmen Exporters and Importers, Ltd., [1952] 2
Q.B. 439.
152. Competex, S.A. (in Liquidation) v. LaBow, No. 85-7605 (2d Cir. Feb. 12, 1986)
(available Mar. 15, 1986, on LEXIS, Genfed library, USAPP file).
153. See, e.g., id. (pagination not available).
154. This factor is well-presented in Bowles & Phillips, Judgments in Foreign Currencies:
An Economist's View, 39 MOD. L. REv. 196, 197-98 (1976):
It can be seen that over the period illustrated [in the article], when sterling has been
depreciating against both the Deutschmark and the Swiss franc, United Kingdom Mini-
mum Lending Rate has been approximately double the German and Swiss interest rates.
This is to be expected since the central banks of countries with depreciating currencies
generally use increases in interest rates to attract foreign investment by offsetting, to some
extent, the expected devaluation on the capital. If the devaluation were fully offset by the
change in interest rates, the application of the old rules would amount to full compensa-
tion, since the effect of sterling's depreciation on the value of the debt in a foreign credi-
tor's own currency would then be associated with a (higher) rate of interest payable on it;
but in practice the relationship between exchange rates and interest rates is not so
straightforward.
155. English treatment of interest rate determinations has recognized the need to treat
interest rates as separate and important components of damage awards. In Helmsing Schif-
fahrts G.m.b.H. v. Malta Drydocks Corp., [1977] 2 Lloyds L. R. 444 (Q.B.), the court refined
the analysis of Miliangos (No. 2), [1976] 3 All E.R. 599, [1977] Q.B. 489. Miliangos explicitly
recognized the relationship between exchange rates of currencies and interest rates. Upon
remand from the House of Lords, Judge Bristow expressly stated that, in calculating the
amount of the judgment debt, Swiss interest rates should be applied to the original Swiss franc
debt. "In my judgment the approach in English law should be: if you opt for a judgment in
foreign currency, for better or for worse you commit yourself to whatever rate of interest
obtains in the context of the currency." Miliangos (No. 2), [1977] Q.B. at 495. This position
has been taken by the Law Commission in its final report: "where judgment is given in a
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demonstrate the exercise of judicial discretion in this area in a manner
inconsistent with the home currency judgment rule.
Several U.S. cases have made reference to foreign law on interest rates
in their damage awards. Those cases falling into the domain of the Con-
vention on Foreign Arbitral Awards have upheld foreign interest rates
chosen by arbitrators for pre-judgment interest.156 While the Convention
legitimizes the application of non-domestic factors occurring prior to
U.S. enforcement, courts still adhere to domestic law for post-judgment
interest. 157
The application of foreign law on interest rates in U.S. judgments has
not been limited to enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. Where arbi-
tration has not been involved, other approaches have been applied, such
foreign currency, the interest should, prima facie, be awarded at the rate applicable to that
currency." Law Commission Report No. 124, Private International Law Foreign Money Lia-
bilities, 2.33 (1983).
The court in Helmsing Shiffahrts, finding this rule unworkable, adopted a more flexible ver-
sion of the holding in Miliangos. The plaintiff in Helmsing Shiffahrts found it necessary to
borrow money in Germany at German commercial borrowing rates when the defendant failed
to make proper payment on the contract involved, although the currency of the contract was
Maltese pounds. Judge Kerr, following Miliangos, rendered judgment in Maltese pounds.
However, he also held that the plaintiffs were entitled to interest calculated according to pre-
vailing German commercial borrowing rates. The court distinguished this case from the sim-
pler case of Miliangos by explaining that when the currency of account and the plaintiff's own
currency were not the same, a different rule should be applied. The controlling standard, also
enunciated in Miliangos, should be the location where the plaintiff reasonably would have
borrowed the money.
156. In Laminoirs-Tefileries-Cableries de Lens v. Southwire Co., 484 F. Supp. 1063 (N.D.
Ga. 1980), for example, the court enforced a foreign arbitral award while specifically allowing
the interest rate for the award to remain at the French legal rate chosen by the arbitrators.
The court recognized that interest on a French franc obligation should be at the French rate of
interest, calculated from the breach date to the judgment date. However, the court refused to
enforce a portion of the arbitral award that assessed an additional 5% interest, finding that
such an award was penal in nature, and not for the redress of private injuries. Id. at 1070-71.
In Fertilizer Corp. of India v. IDI Management, Inc., 517 F. Supp. 948 (S.D. Ohio 1981), a
federal district court in Ohio was asked to enforce an arbitral award rendered in India. The
court ordered post-judgment interest but refused to grant pre-judgment interest on the award,
since such interest was not available under the Indian Arbitration Act. However, adjourning
the petition for enforcement while the award was before the Indian courts for review, the court
indicated that upon favorable review in the Indian courts, it would enforce the award and
"order interest as of the date this opinion is entered." Id. at 962. In so doing, the court
recognized that Indian law concerning interest on the award would apply until such time as
the award became enforceable by judgment in the United States.
157. See 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a) (1982) (post-judgment interest rate statute). Although the
court in Laminours found that the award was to be converted into U.S. dollars in accordance
with a judgment date rule using the date of the district court's judgment, it held that subse-
quent interest was to be governed by the federal post-judgment rate statute. 484 F. Supp. at
1071. This statute has been expressly interpreted as governing only post-judgment interest,
leaving determinations of pre-judgment interest to the sole discretion of the court. See G.M.
Brod & Co. v. U.S. Home Corp., 759 F.2d 1526, 1542 (11th Cir. 1985); Weitz Co. v. Mo-Kan
Carpet, Inc., 723 F.2d 1382, 1385-87 (8th Cir. 1983); S.L. Sethia Liners, Ltd. v. The Egyptian
Co. for Maritime Transport, No. 82 Civ. 2886 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 14, 1985) (available Mar. 15,
1986, on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. file).
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as choice of law analyses recognizing foreign law. Discretion arising
from this approach has allowed the choice of the pre-judgment interest
rate to be made on the basis of equity. 158
Deference by U.S. courts to foreign interest rates has arisen in some
cases despite strong precedent that damage awards passing through U.S.
courts be in U.S. currency computed by U.S. standards. Recognition of
foreign law in a determination of pre-judgment interest represents a con-
cession by U.S. courts to the realities of international markets; courts in
this context do not take the home currency rule as an absolute.
5. Consent Judgment in Foreign Currency
Although no American case has clearly granted judgment after trial in
a foreign currency, an example of judgment in a foreign currency does
exist other than in the enforcement of a foreign judgment or arbitral
award. In Baumlin & Ernst, Ltd. v. Gemini, Ltd,159 a consent judgment
was originally entered in the district court, requiring the American buyer
to satisfy its payment obligation on a contract for the sale of Swiss yarn
by making six installment payments over a period of five years. The
seller insisted that the consent judgment be expressed in Swiss francs and
not in U.S. dollars to avoid the risk of currency fluctuation where pay-
ment was to be in stages over a period in excess of four years. 160 When
the buyer later defaulted, the fourth circuit noted that, "a customary
judgment would have had to have been stated in United States dollars,"
but went on to affirm the consent judgment expressed in Swiss francs as
"an entirely new agreement not subordinate to anything that had gone
before." 161
Although Baumlin did not amount to a final judgment being entered
in a foreign currency after trial, and even though the opinion expressly
stated that such a judgment would have to be stated in U.S. currency, the
case does represent a binding judgment rendered in the federal courts
which was expressed in a foreign currency. The Baumlin court relied
upon section 20 of the Currency Act of 1792 and cases citing it for the
158. In Rose Hall, Ltd. v. Chase Manhattan Overseas Banking Corp., 566 F. Supp. 1558
(D. Del. 1983), a Delaware district court dealt with the interest problem by noting that both
the availability and rate of prejudgment interest on an action arising under Jamaican law were
to be determined by the law of Jamaica. The case involved an action for wrongful interference
with a contract for the sale of hotel property in Jamaica to an agency of the Jamaican govern-
ment. The court rendered judgment in U.S. dollars both because of the currency of the loss
and of the plaintiff. However, determining whether and at what rate pre-judgment interest was
to be awarded, the court, sitting in diversity, looked to the conflict of law rules of Delaware,
which were determined to direct the court to Jamaican law. Jamaican law was construed to
allow pre-judgment interest at a rate to be set at the discretion of the court.
159. 637 F.2d 238 (4th Cir. 1980).
160. Id. at 240.
161. Id. at 245.
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proposition that judgment after trial in a U.S. court must be in U.S. cur-
rency. 162 With this reliance no longer justified it appears that a U.S.
court could take the step from rendering a consent judgment in foreign
currency to rendering a judgment after trial in foreign currency.
The likely adoption of a foreign currency judgment rule in the United
States still leaves problems. As drafted, the Restatement foreign cur-
rency judgment rule will allow the victorious plaintiff to choose between
a judgment in U.S. dollars or in foreign currency. The Restatement has
not addressed which type of judgment is more equitable or the control
the court should exercise in the judgment. 163 In addition, many state
statutes appear to be in conflict with the foreign currency rules and, if
followed, would lead to inconsistent results. It is to these problems that
this Article now turns in the further consideration of the home currency
judgment rule.
B. State Law and the Erie Problem
The Revised Restatement provides that "[c]ourts in the United States
. . .are not precluded from giving judgment in the currency in which
the obligation is denominated or the loss was incurred."1 64 While this
may be true for federal courts in the exercise of federal question jurisdic-
tion,1 65 when a case arises in a state court or in a federal court sitting in
diversity, the court may be precluded by state law from granting a pure
foreign currency judgment.
At least eighteen states have statutes whose language may be con-
strued to require a home currency judgment.166 Statutes in seven of these
states-California, Iowa, Maryland, Montana, South Carolina, Tennes-
see, and Vermont-explicitly require judgment to be rendered in U.S.
162. Id. at 244 & n.9.
163. The Restatement's "extreme rule of creditor's preference that can enable the creditor
to benefit from currency fluctuations," has already been the subject of judicial criticism. See
Competex, S.A. (in Liquidation) v. LaBow, No. 85-7605 (2d Cir., Feb. 12, 1986) (available
Mar. 15, 1986, on LEXIS, Genfed library, USAPP file) (pagination not available).
164. RESTATEMENT, supra note 95.
165. See supra notes 96-133 and accompanying text.
166. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 29-115 (1947); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 577.5 (West 1976);
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 6850 (West 1980); IDAHO CODE § 28-42-401 (1980); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 535.1 (West 1950); LA. REv. ST. ANN. § 1:53 (West 1973); MD. CTs. & JUD. PROC. CODE
ANN. § 11-101 (1984); MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 438.1 (WEST 1978); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 25-9-203 (1983); NEv. REv. STAT. §§ 17.120, 17.130 (1979); N.J. REv. STAT. § 51:2-1
(1970); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 56-8-1 (1978); N.Y. JUD. LAW § 27 (McKinney 1983); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 34-31-10 (Law. Co-op 1977); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-14-101 (1984); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 9, § 1 (1984); VA. CODE § 6.1-330.6 (1983); W. VA. CODE § 47-6-1 (1980); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 138.03 (West 1974).
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currency. 167 In four others-Arkansas, Nevada, New York, and Wis-
consin-the statutes initially state a requirement that judgments be in
"dollars and cents," but include language implying that the legislative
purpose did not include consideration of foreign currency judgments. 168
Five of the eighteen states have statutes which mirror the "money of
account" language originally included in section 20 of the Currency Act
of 1792.169 None of these statutes has been the subject of recorded judi-
cial interpretation. They present the same ambiguities as the original
167. CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 577.5 (West 1976) ("In any judgment, or execution upon
such judgment, the amount shall be computed and stated in dollars and cents, rejecting frac-
tions."); IOWA CODE ANN. § 535.1 (West 1950) ("Demands expressed in money of another
denomination [other than U.S. dollars] shall not be affected by the provisions of this section,
but in any action or proceeding based thereon it shall be reduced to and computed by the
denominations given."); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 11-101 (1984) ("Except as
otherwise provided by Law, a money judgment ... rendered or imposed by any court of the
State shall be expressed in dollars and cents."); MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-9-203 (1983) ("In
judgments, the amounts thereof must be computed and stated as near as may be in dollars and
cents, rejecting fractions of a cent."); S.C. CODE ANN. § 34-31-10 (Law. Co-op 1977) ("[Ihe
verdicts of all juries on all contracts. . . shall be expressed in dollars or units thereof. .. .");
TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-14-101 (1984) ("All verdicts and judgments shall be rendered in dol-
lars and cents. . . ."); VT. STAT. ANN. tit 9, § 1 (1984) ("[Tlhis section shall not affect an
account, charge or entry originally made or a contract expressed in other money of account,
but the same shall be reduced to dollars and parts of a dollar in an action thereon.").
The California statute falling within this grouping is in addition to a separate "money of
account" statute, CAL. GOV'T CODE § 6850 (West 1980), which is similar to those discussed
infra note 169. This suggests that the money of account statutes themselves should not be
taken, without more, as requiring judgments in U.S. currency. Despite the apparently clear
language of the Maryland statutesupra, an early Maryland Court of Appeals case upheld a
judgment rendered in British sterling. Purviance v. Neave, 4 H. & McH. 199 (Md. 1798).
However, in a later case, the Maryland Court of Appeals did not follow Purviance, ruling that
"the court was not at liberty to disregard [the statute] and enter the judgment for money in
other denominations than those prescribed." Marburg v. Marburg, 26 Md. 8, 21 (1866).
168. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 29-115 (1947); NEv. REv. STAT. § 17.130 (1979); N.Y. JUD.
LAW § 27 (McKinney 1983); Wis. STAT. § 138.03 (1974). The New York statute is a good
example of these statutes. Its concluding language, that "no judgment, or other proceeding,
shall be considered erroneous for such omissions," seems to imply that the purpose of the
statute may have been simply to avoid judgments in amounts including fractions of cents. It
has been suggested that the fact that the definition of "money judgment" in the New York
statutes is not limited to U.S. currency, N.Y. CIV. PRAC. LAW § -105(n) (McKinney 1972), the
inclusion of foreign currency in the notion of "money" in the New York Uniform Commercial
Code, N.Y. U.C.C. § 1-201(24) (McKinney 1964), the broad authorization to the state admin-
istrator to adopt an appendix of forms to the Civil Practice Law and Rules along with the lack
of adoption of an official form of judgment, N.Y. CIV. PRAC. LAW § 107 (McKinney 1972),
and the failure of the Civil Practice Law and Rules to restrict the content of judgments in any
relevant respect, N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 5011 (McKinney 1963), all combine to be "sufficient
to override an ancient, dubiously applicable statute." Becker, supra note 11, at 157 n.25.
169. See supra notes 100-108 and accompanying text. IDAHO CODE § 28-42-401 (1980);
LA. REv. STAT. ANN § 1:53 (West 1973); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 438.1 (West 1978);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-12-601 (1983); N.J. Rtv. STAT. § 51:2-1 (1970); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 56-8-1 (1978). Montana, in addition to its provisions listed, supra note 167, has a statutory
provision which allows for any "account, charge or entry originally made or any note, bond, or
other instrument expressed in any other money of account," but then requires that "the same
must be reduced to dollars and cents in any action." MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-12-602 (1983).
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language of section 20 of the Currency Act of 1792 and, accordingly, do
not clearly prevent a judgment from being rendered in a foreign cur-
rency. Finally, Virginia and West Virginia have nearly identical statutes
specifically dealing with claims expressed in a foreign currency.1 70 While
these seemingly allow foreign currency judgments, the Virginia statute
has been interpreted to require that the fact finder ultimately determine
the value of the claim "in domestic money." 171
In taking the position that U.S. courts should be able to grant judg-
ment in foreign currency, the Restatement does not consider the impact
of the restrictive state statutes discussed above. While the Restatement
may provide impetus for judicial development, it cannot repeal statutes
requiring a home currency judgment. Consequently, in some states the
first procedural step under Miliangos-a foreign currency judgment-ap-
pears at first glance to be unavailable.
Under the doctrine of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,1 72 this same re-
striction would be applied by federal courts sitting in diversity in states
with home currency judgment rules. In Vishipco Line v. Chase Manhat-
tan Bank N.A., 173 the Second Circuit was faced with the choice between
the New York breach date rule and the federal judgment date rule.
Vietnamese corporations and a Vietnamese citizen brought a breach of
contract action against Chase Manhattan for amounts on deposit in its
Saigon branch, which was closed when Chase officials in New York de-
termined that Saigon would fall. Plaintiffs' deposits with the Saigon
branch totalled 338,974,671 piastres, 174 and evidence showed an official
exchange rate of 755 piastres to the dollar on the date of the bank's clos-
ing.175 On the date of judgment, however, the piastre was worthless.
The decision whether the New York breach date rule or the federal judg-
ment date rule should apply thus determined whether the plaintiffs
would receive $448,973 or nothing at all.
170. VA. CODE § 6.1-330.7 (1950); W. VA. CODE § 47-6-3 (1980). The Virginia statute
includes a proviso that "as to any such suit involving an instrument to which § 8.3-107 of the
[Virginia] Uniform Commercial Code is applicable, the provisions of that section shall apply."
For a discussion of the impact of U.C.C. § 3-107 on foreign currency judgments, see infra
notes 199-203 and accompanying text.
171. George Campbell Co. v. Angus, 91 Va. 438, 22 S.E. 167, 168 (1895).
172. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
173. 660 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1981).
174. Id. at 857.
175. Id. at 865.
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After noting that "federal courts sitting in non-diversity cases have
rather consistently adopted the judgment-day rule,"' 176 the Second Cir-
cuit stated that, "this rule is substantive rather than procedural (there is
no Federal Rule of Procedure on the subject) and therefore cannot be
followed by federal courts sitting in diversity in states which apply the
breach-date rule."' 177 The application of the New York breach date rule
was seen as "fulfilling 'the twin aims of the Erie rule: discouragement of
forum-shopping and avoidance of inequitable administration of the
laws.' "178
Although Vishipco Line stands for the proposition that state law gov-
erns on the issue of conversion date, it does not necessarily prevent a
federal court sitting in a diversity case from applying a federal rule al-
lowing judgment to be rendered in a foreign currency. As Miliangos
made clear, the issue of whether judgment can be rendered in a foreign
currency is separate from the issue of what exchange rate is applied if
judgment is given in the home currency.' 79 If a federal court faced with
the issue of whether judgment can be given in a foreign currency decides,
as did the House of Lords in Miliangos, that this question is one of proce-
dure, 180 then federal law, rather than state law, should arguably control
the result.' 8 '
A characterization of the rule as substantive or procedural, however,
will not answer the question. Although Justice Reed, concurring in Erie,
stated that "no one doubts federal power over procedure,' 82 since then
"the Erie doctrine has been substantially redefined by the Supreme
Court, and it is now clear that no simple dichotomy between substance
and procedure will determine the issue of which state law is to con-
trol."' 83 The Guaranty Trust case' 84 introduced the "outcome-determi-
176. Id. (emphasis in original) (citing Zimmerman v. Sutherland, 274 U.S. 253 (1927);
Deutsche Bank filiale Nurenberg v. Humphrey, 272 U.S. 517 (1926); Conte v. Flota Mercante
del Estado, 277 F.2d 664 (2d Cir. 1960); and Shaw, Savill, Albion & Co. v. The Fredericks-
burg, 189 F.2d 952 (2d Cir. 1951)).
177. 660 F.2d at 865. Lord Wilberforce, in Miliangos, made reference to the importance of
the substance-procedure dichotomy in the conflict of laws context in stating, "though English
law (lex fori) prevails as regards procedural matters, it must surely be wrong in principle to
allow procedure to affect, detrimentally, the substance of the creditor's rights." Miliangos,
1976 A.C. at 465.
178. 660 F.2d at 866 (quoting Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1968)).
179. Miliangos, 1976 A.C. at 461-64.
180. Supra note 177.
181. This position is further strengthened for a court sitting in New York because the
controlling New York statute is part of the procedural rules set forth in the New York Judici-
ary Law, which was enacted in 1797. See supra note 168.
182. Erie, 304 U.S. at 92.
183. C. WRIGHT. HORNBOOK ON THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 59 (4th ed. 1983).
184. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
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native" test to determine whether state or federal law should control.
Under its guidelines, the ability to give judgment in a foreign currency,
although not determinative of the liability claim itself, would certainly
have a substantial impact on the judgment amount.18 5 Moreover if, as
suggested by Miliangos,186 the ability to give judgment in a foreign cur-
rency is in the nature of the ability to award specific performance, there
is precedent for the proposition that state law should govern as a substan-
tive matter.18 7
If, contrary to the above characterization, a state rule were classified as
procedural and non-outcome determinative, a Federal Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure would clearly supercede it. 188 The outcome is less clear, however,
where the only rule on the issue is a state statute. In promoting the "dis-
couragement of forum-shopping and avoidance of inequitable adminis-
tration of the laws,"189 the court in such a case should balance the
competing state and federal interests, as suggested by the Supreme Court
in Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative, Inc.190 A strong argu-
ment can be made that in matters of foreign commerce the federal inter-
est merits a rule to be applied consistently in all federal courts.191
185. See, e.g., supra notes 173-78. See also Becker, supra note 11, at 158 n.31 ("Of course,
in pre-Hanna terms, the question whether the plaintiff will recover the foreign currency
equivalent of, say, $50,000 or $75,000 involves an issue that is 'substantive' and 'outcome'
determinative.").
186. Miliangos, 1976 A.C. at 467-68.
187. See, e.g., Weathersby v. Gore, 556 F.2d 1247, 1257-59 (5th Cir. 1977).
188. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 469-70 (1965). The federal court can refuse to
apply the federal rule "only if the Advisory Committee, this [Supreme] Court, and Congress
erred in their prima facie judgment that the Rule in question transgressed neither the terms of
the Enabling Act nor constitutional restrictions." Id. at 471. It has been suggested that in the
Hanna context, § 20 of the Currency Act of 1792 "may be regarded as a declaration of federal
court law that need not bow to a contrary state rule." Becker, supra note 11, at 158 n.31.
However, the lack of any clear provision on the matter in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
combined with the 1982 revision and restatement of this provision make this position weak at
best.
189. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 468.
190. 356 U.S. 525 (1958). See, e.g., cases cited in C. WRIGHT, supra note 183, § 59, n.55.
191. This interest was highlighted in Justice Story's opinion in Swift v. Tyson, when he
emphasized the need for uniformity in federal courts on questions of general commercial law,
dependent not on "the decisions of the local tribunals, but in the general principles and doc-
trines of commercial jurisprudence." 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 19 (1842). In quoting Cicero, he
declared that "[t]he law respecting negotiable instruments" cannot be one thing in Rome and
another in Athens. Id. Some time earlier Justice Story had used the same quotation from
Cicero to apply to "this great system of maritime law." DeLovio v. Boit, 7 F. Cas. 418, 443
(C.D. Mass. 1815) (No. 3776). Even though the principal legal impact of Swift v. Tyson is
considered by most to have been erased by Erie and its progeny, the concept that commercial
law should develop uniformly retains its strong supporters and lends justification to the argu-
ment favoring a federal rule on foreign currency judgments under the Erie doctrine. See, e.g.,
Berman & Kaufman, The Law of International Commercial Transactions, 19 HARV. J. INT'L
L. 221 (1978), updated and reprinted in III A LAWYER'S GUIDE TO INT'L Bus. TRANSAC-
TIONS, Folio 3 (W. Surrey & D. Wallace eds. 1983). For a further example of the application
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Indeed, regardless of the "substantive" or "procedural" characteriza-
tion, the need for a uniform foreign currency judgment rule may compel
its development as a matter of federal common law. The signature of the
United States to the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods 192 arguably makes disputes regarding inter-
national commercial contract issues "concerned with a basic choice re-
garding the competence and function of the Judiciary and the National
Executive in ordering our relationships with other members of the inter-
national community [which therefore] must be treated exclusively as an
aspect of federal (common) law." 193 The development of transnational
consistency in the post-Miliangos changes in commercial law on this sub-
ject makes it an area appropriate for inclusion in the development of fed-
eral common law. The issue would then become subject to federal
question jurisdiction, as it would be "arising under" federal common law.
Since both state and federal courts would be following the "federal" rule,
the confusion of the Erie doctrine could be avoided.1 94
Although the Supreme Court has stated that federal common law is
appropriate in only a "few restricted" instances,1 95 it has also stated that
"[i]n these instances, our federal system does not permit the controversy
to be resolved under state law, either because the authority and duties of
the United States as sovereign are intimately involved or because the in-
terstate or international nature of the controversy makes it inappropriate
for state law to control."1 96 Foreign currency judgments are thus pecu-
liarly appropriate for treatment as a matter of federal common law, im-
plicating as they do U.S. interests in free trade and international comity.
of the federal (common) law merchant, see Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363,
367 (1943).
192. U.N. Conference on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Final Act (April
10, 1980), U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 97/18, reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 668 (1980).
193. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 425 (1964).
194. Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972). See C. WRIGHT, supra note 183, § 60.
Such a development would unify state law because federal common law is binding on both
state and federal courts. Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663 (1962); see also Yiatchos v. Yiatchos, 376
U.S. 306 (1964). A complete discussion of the federal common law as it applies to commercial
transactions is beyond the scope of this Article. In matters of federal question jurisdiction, and
in diversity actions in all but the eighteen states with statutes discussed at supra notes 165-71,
no prohibition on giving judgment in a foreign currency appears to exist legitimately. In those
states with statutes arguably prohibiting foreign currency judgments, however, short of repeal
or amendment, a federal common law approach is one possibility available for constructive
change. For a more complete discussion of federal common law, see 19 C. WRIGHT, A.
MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4515 (1982); M. REDISH,
FEDERAL JURISDICTION 84-107 (1980).
195. Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 313 (1981) (quoting Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373
U.S. 647, 651 (1963)).
196. Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 641 (1981).
Vol. 11:139, 1985
Foreign Currency Judgments
Additionally, the adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code by all
fifty states197 has made the home currency judgment rule an anomaly as
a matter of state law. Although none of the Article 2 sales provisions
addresses the issue of payment or judgment in a foreign currency, many
of the Code's other provisions dictate allowance of a foreign currency
judgment. Section 1-201(24), for example, defines "money" expansively
as "a medium of exchange authorized or adopted by a domestic or for-
eign government as a part of its currency."' 198 Sections 3-104 and 3-107
include foreign currency obligations in the definition of negotiable instru-
ments. Notably, Section 3-107(2) provides in part that "[i]f such an in-
strument specifies a foreign currency as the medium of payment, the
instrument is payable in that currency."' 199 Together, the provisions re-
quire that a debt in a foreign currency be repaid in that currency and are
thus inconsistent with a home currency judgment rule.2°°
Indeed, the U.C.C. provisions have been so interpreted in New York.
When the U.C.C. was being considered in New York, the New York
Clearing House Association objected to the adoption of section 3-107 on
the grounds that it would require a foreign currency judgment inconsis-
tent with federal and New York law.201 The provision was dropped, and
the New York U.C.C. now permits enforcement of a foreign currency
claim only in U.S. dollars.202 The inclusion of the provision in the com-
mercial codes of other states dictates the contrary result, to wit, that a
foreign currency judgment is available. It is anomalous to have a statute
197. The jurisdictions enacting the U.C.C. and the dates of enactment are listed in 1
U.L.A. Supp. 1 (Supp. 1985). Louisiana has adopted only Articles 1, 3, 4, 5, 7 and 8. Id.
198. U.C.C. § 1-201(24) (1977).
199. U.C.C. § 3-107(2) (1977). The full text of this paragraph, as adopted in all states but
New York, states:
(2) A promise or order to pay a sum stated in a foreign currency is for a sum certain in
money and, unless a different medium of payment is specified in the instrument, may be
satisfied by payment of that number of dollars which the stated foreign currency will
purchase at the buying sight rate for that currency on the day on which the instrument is
payable or, if payable on demand, on the day of demand. If such an instrument specifies a
foreign currency as the medium of payment the instrument is payable in that currency.
In New York, the final sentence of this provision was deleted. N.Y. U.C.C. § 3-107 (McKin-
ney 1965). See Penney, New York Revisits the Code: Some Variations in the Enactment of the
U.C.C., 62 COLUM. L. REv. 992, 997 (1962).
200. The U.C.C. adopts "the position that an instrument expressing the amount to be paid
in sterling, francs, lire or other recognized currency of a foreign government is negotiable even
though payable in the United States." U.C.C. § 3-107, comment 1 (1977). In the terms of the
English courts, this allows both the money of account and the money of payment on a negotia-
ble instrument to be in a foreign currency, even though governed by U.S. law. See supra note
16. As such, it seems somewhat anomalous that, in an action to enforce the payment obliga-
tion on such an instrument, a court could not render judgment for the amount promised.
201. NEW YORK CLEARING HOUSE ASS'N, REPORT ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE (1961) quoted in Penney, supra note 199, at 997.
202. N.Y.U.C.C. § 3-107 (McKinney 1965); but see supra note 168.
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which provides for instruments payable in a foreign currency if such in-
struments are not enforceable in those terms in the courts. 20 3
In the absence of the development of federal common law, state and
federal courts may take guidance from the Practice Direction promul-
gated by the English Supreme Court following the Miliangos decision. 2°4
Under Paragraph 5 of the Practice Direction, a judgment may be issued
in the home currency but has the effect of a foreign currency judgment
through the use of the following paragraph:
It is this day adjudged that the Defendant do pay the Plaintiff (state the sum
in foreign currency for which the Court has ordered judgment to be entered)
or the Sterling equivalent at the time of payment and £ ...... costs (or costs
to be taxed).20 5
Thus even if a state statute is interpreted as requiring that judgment be
expressed in U.S. dollars, the judgment could take into account the plain-
tiff's expectations for a foreign currency recovery. The form of the judg-
ment could be similar to the following:
It is this day adjudged that the Defendant pay the Plaintiff the amount in
U.S. dollars, dimes and cents which shall be the equivalent of (here state the
sum in foreign currency as found due by the court) at the time of
payment. 206
203. To date the only cases which appear to have interpreted U.C.C. § 3-107 have been in
the N~w York courts. Lausen v. Federman, 9 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 866 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1971);
Weston Banking Corp. v. Turkiye Garanti Bankasi A.S., 86 A.D.2d 544, 446 N.Y.S.2d 67, 69-
70 (App. Div. 1982). As such, the final sentence of § 3-107(2) has not been considered by the
courts. Both of the New York cases converted the foreign currency debt to U.S. dollars at the
breach date rate of exchange. The Lausen opinion specifically cited § 3-107(2) as authority for
selecting the breach date exchange rate. Lausen, supra, at 867. Section 3-107(2) does state
that a negotiable instrument payable in a foreign currency "may be satisfied by payment of that
number of dollars which the stated foreign currency will purchase at the buying sight rate for
that currency on the day on which the instrument is payable." However, in a time of rapidly
fluctuating exchange rates it works an injustice to interpret a statute which allows for payment
at the due date exchange rate if payment is made on the due date to require payment at the due
date rate of exchange if payment is not made until after a lengthy court proceeding.
204. Practice Direction, [1976] 1 All E.R. 669; [1976] 1 W.L.R. 83.
205. Id. at 669, [1976] 1 W.L.R. at 84 (emphasis in original).
206. This is similar to the recommendation of the British Columbia Law Reform Commis-
sion in dealing with the Canadian federal statute which has been interpreted to require that
Canadian judgments be expressed in Canadian currency. See LAW REFORM COMMISSION,
supra note 85, at 60. The Commission there suggests that the judgment "should be compara-
ble to" the following language:
THIS COURT ORDERS that the defendant(s) pay to the plaintiff (s)
(i)(state the sum in foreign currency in which judgment has been ordered to be entered)
and
(ii)(interest as claimed or, interest pursuant to the Court Order Interest Act)
or the equivalent, at the time of payment, in Canadian currency, and costs to be taxed.





Such a statement of the judgment would merely constitute recognition
of a long-standing principle of contract law that a sum due in a foreign
currency may be satisfied at the option of the debtor, by tender of the
equivalent sum, determined at the time of payment in the local cur-
rency.20 7 The judgment would be rendered in the home currency, but
would reflect the amount due in the foreign currency, which would be
the more appropriate currency for expression of the liability.20 8 By stat-
ing the judgment in this manner, the court could both respect the state
statute involved and provide for the expression of a foreign currency lia-
bility in a manner consistent with that in which the liability was
incurred.
C. Providing Proper Compensation for Damages Suffered
The adoption of a foreign currency judgment rule, without more, will
not resolve the issue of the appropriate damages to be awarded the suc-
cessful plaintiff. In fact, a pure foreign currency judgment rule could
provide results as inequitable as those possible under the home currency
judgment rule.
Because the rules currently applied in the United States do not always
promote the objectives of compensating the plaintiff for reasonably fore-
seeable economic loss and avoiding the unjust enrichment of the defend-
ant, they guarantee neither certainty nor equity. One of the criticisms of
the English Law Commission's Working Paper which followed Miliangos
was that its analysis was "premised upon the belief. . . that the injustice
of the traditional rules is self-evident and the reforms are to be wel-
comed. 20 9 If change is to be suggested in the United States, we too must
first demonstrate the need for that change and propose a rule which pro-
vides improved results.
Although selecting a single conversion date may provide some degree
of certainty for litigants when a home currency judgment is required, it
will not provide a just result in every case.210 Underlying the rationale in
most cases is the natural reaction that any risk of depreciation should be
207. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 3-107(2); A. NUSSBAUM, supra note 11, at 371; F. MANN, supra
note 11, at 312. This is the form used in the French courts. See A. NUSSBAUM, supra note 11,
at 374.
208. There is U.S. precedent for language which in fact states the amount of the judgment
in the foreign currency and then sets a date for conversion. Island Territory of Curacao v.
Solitron Devices, Inc., 356 F. Supp. 1, 14 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) ("There will be judgment in favor of
Curacao against Solitron for 445,682.35 Netherlands Antilles guilders, to be converted into
United States dollars at the rate prevailing on the date of judgment. .. ").
209. Bowles & Whelan, Law Commission Working Paper No. 80 Private International Law
Foreign Money Liabilities, 45 MOD. L. Rnv. 434 (1982).
210. See, eg., text and chart accompanying note 11.
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on the wrongdoer. "[I]n general, courts have endeavored to select the
rule that, in a given case, will prevent the loss from fluctuation of ex-
change rates from being borne by the injured or non-breaching party. '211
This approach acknowledges that the injured party was harmed not only
by the breach or the tort itself, but further by not being compensated for
the injury immediately and thereby being subjected to the risks of ex-
change rate fluctuations which were not allocated by agreement. As the
British have found, the breach date rule will not serve well when the
home currency is comparatively weak during the period in question.
Similarly, a judgment date rule (or even a strictly applied payment date
rule) will create unfairness when the home currency is the stronger of the
currencies involved.
Lord Denning may have been correct in 1961 when he stated that
"[s]o long as sterling is regarded as stable whilst other currencies go up
and down, it would seem that justice is best done by taking the rate of
exchange at the date of breach. '212 However, the application of the same
rule in The Teh Hu, when sterling was the weak currency, led to concern
for unfairness in the treatment of the injured party.213 By the time
Miliangos arose, the House of Lords refused to continue the sterling
judgment breach date rule where the plaintiff would have suffered from
the currency fluctuation during the period from the date of injury until
payment of the judgment. 214 Despite language to the contrary,215 the
Miliangos opinion now clearly stands for the policy that an innocent
party should not bear the burden of exchange rate fluctuations occurring
after the breach and over which neither party had any control.
Like the House of Lords in Miliangos, U.S. courts have had problems
with the home currency judgment breach date rule where the home cur-
rency has been the weaker of the two currencies involved. In In re Good
Hope Chemical Corp.,216 the First Circuit, in a bankruptcy case, chose
the breach date exchange rate, but determined the date of breach to be
the date on which the bankruptcy court allowed the rejection of the con-
tract, rather than the much earlier date on which the bankruptcy petition
211. RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 823, Reporter's Note 4
(Tent. Draft No. 6, 1985).
212. Re United Railways of Havana and Regla Warehouses Ltd., 1961 A.C. 1007, 1069.
213. [1970] P. 106 (C.A.). For a discussion of the case, see supra notes 33-34 and accom-
panying text.
214. Miliangos, 1976 A.C. at 469.
215. Id. at 465, 474-76, 497 (rejecting the application of the maxim cessante ratione cessat
ipsa lex ("the reason for the law ceasing, the law itself ceases") as a justification for departure
from the sterling breach date rule).
216. 747 F.2d 805 (lst Cir. 1984).
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was filed.217 The result was that, in a case where the judgment date rule
would have favored the plaintiff, the court felt compelled to follow the
breach date rule, but tempered any inequity by determining that the date
of breach was a date nearer the date of judgment.
Just as U.S. courts have stretched to accommodate the plaintiff in ap-
plying the breach date rule to cases where the foreign currency has been
strong, courts faced with a strong dollar have stretched to apply the
breach date rule and avoid the judgment date rule whenever possible.218
The rationale given by Justice Holmes for the judgment date rule was
that "[a] suit in this country is based upon an obligation existing under
the foreign law at the time when the suit is brought, and the obligation is
not enlarged by the fact that the creditor happens to be able to catch his
debtor here." 219 Neither should the obligation be diminished by that
fact. If the purpose of the choice of law analysis is, at least in part, to
prevent international forum shopping, then a judgment in a U.S. court
should be for the same amount as a judgment in any other court which
might have jurisdiction over the parties.
Not only are the breach date and judgment date rules inadequate when
taken separately, but they remain inadequate when a court distorts the
language of prior cases in order to provide itself with the benefit of
whichever of the two it might prefer to choose. If the truly equitable
course is to award the plaintiff the same number of units of a foreign
currency as contained in the original obligation, then the payment date,
and neither the judgment date nor the breach date, is the appropriate
date if conversion is required. It is misleading to contort the process to
reach the judgment date result when what the court prefers is payment
date effect. Setting any one date as that required for conversion can
never result in a rule which will be evenly applied by the courts in all
cases. Although Justice Holmes' choice of law rationale carries with it a
sense of neat legal symmetry, the fact is that it too has not been applied
evenly by the courts and simply is not a fair rule in all cases. Two con-
tracts for exactly the same amount, expressed in exactly the same cur-
rency, when breached, could produce entirely different results simply
because the place of payment or the law chosen to govern the contracts
differed.
As inequitable as the home currency judgment conversion date rules
can be, a foreign currency judgment rule is no better unless it takes into
217. Id. at 812-13.
218. See, e.g., Compania Engraw Commercial E. Industrial S.A. v. Schenley Distillers
Corp., 181 F.2d 876, 879 (9th Cir. 1950).
219. Die Deutsche Bank filiale Nurenberg v. Humphrey, 272 U.S. 517, 519 (1926).
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account the true nature of the damages suffered. Although a pure for-
eign currency judgment rule avoids the problematic issue of determining
an appropriate conversion date, its rigid application will fairly compen-
sate the successful plaintiff only in times of a weak home currency. Such
a rule is no more than a rigid home currency judgment rule combined
with a mandatory payment date conversion rate. The Miliangos rule in
England has been interpreted by some to require this result.220 Although
this rule will be fair so long as sterling remains weak, in periods of a
strong pound it will be as unfair as the sterling judgment breach date rule
has been in times of a weak pound.
The new Restatement rule appears at first to avoid the problems of a
rigid foreign currency judgment rule. It gives the plaintiff the option of
seeking judgment either in the foreign currency, if it is "the currency in
220. The Miliangos decision and the events leading up to it were driven in large part by the
declining value of sterling as compared to other major currencies. However, in its rush to
develop a rule which protects a creditor (or any other prevailing party) in times of a weak
home currency, the English courts may have set up a rule that will be equally problematic if
and when sterling once again becomes the stronger of the two currencies involved. The Report
of the Law Commission speaks of a "completely new principle governing the treatment by the
courts of foreign-currency obligations," and notes that the foreign currency will be the cur-
rency of judgment in appropriate cases, "for good or ill." Law Commission Report No. 124,
supra note 155, at 25 (emphasis in original). It later states that "to allow the plaintiff to seek
judgment in sterling in the case of a foreign-currency claim would be contrary to the principle
in Miliangos," and concludes that "[a] plaintiff should not be able to obtain judgment in ster-
ling in the case of enforcement of a claim which ought properly to be expressed in a foreign
currency." Id. at 3.9, 3.11.
The courts and commentators have not made this position so clear. The Practice Direction
adopted immediately after Miliangos left the issue unresolved. Practice Direction, [1976] 1 All
E.R. 669. In Federal Commerce v. Tradax Export S.A., Lord Denning indicated that the
plaintiff has no option when he stated, "[o]nce it is recognised that judgment can be given in a
foreign currency, justice requires that it should be given in every case where the currency of
the contract is a foreign currency." [1977] 2 All E.R. 41, 51 (C.A.) (emphasis in original). In
Barclays Bank Int'l v. Levin Bros. (Bradford) Ltd., Judge Mocatta seemed to take a more
flexible approach, rejecting the argument that "where the obligation in the contract is ex-
pressed in terms entitling the creditor to a sum expressed in a foreign currency, judgment must
• ..be given in that currency." [1976] 3 All E.R. 900, 909 (Q.B.). A position somewhere in
the middle was taken by Judge Donaldson in Ozalid Group (Export) Ltd. v. African Continen-
tal Bank Ltd., when he stated that "under the new rule the plaintiff is entitled to make his
claim in foreign currency," but not "required" to do so. [1979] 2 Lloyd's L.R. 231, 233-34
(Q.B.) (emphasis in original). Justice Donaldson would not give the plaintiff a free choice, but
rather leave it to the plaintiff, "to select the currency in which to make his claim and. . . to
prove that an award or judgment in that currency will most truly express his loss and accord-
ingly most fully and exactly compensate him for that loss." Id. at 234; see also Law Commis-
sion Report No. 124, supra note 155, 39, n.171. A leading commentator has accepted the
mandatory nature of foreign currency judgments after Miliangos, but tempered the effect of
such a rule by calling for the adoption of"a sound rule permitting the recovery of damages for
the loss caused by the depreciation of foreign money." F. MANN, supra note 11, at 348. Other
commentators would apply a more flexible interpretation of the Miliangos rule, allowing the
plaintiff to receive judgment in sterling when it was the stronger currency, thus apparently
offering an option similar to that contemplated by the Revised Restatement § 823. See Bowles
& Whelan, supra note 209, at 440-41 (1982).
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which the obligation is denominated or the loss was incurred," or in
United States dollars.221 If the court gives judgment in U.S. dollars on a
foreign currency obligation, "conversion is to be made at such rate as to
make the creditor whole and to avoid rewarding a debtor who has
delayed in carrying out the obligation. ' 222 The plaintiff is given the bene-
fit of the most favorable rate of exchange, but is limited to the breach
date and judgment date rates.22 3 The result is little better than the rigid
payment date equivalent which may exist in England. Even worse, it
retains the unnecessary breach date judgment date argument. Freed of
the restraints of granting judgment in the home currency, the courts
should reject the resulting conversion date rules and the artificial distinc-
tions upon which they rest. Only then will the courts be able to adopt a
rule consistent with the basic principles of damages in both tort and con-
tract law-that the injured party receive fifll compensation for losses ac-
tually suffered. 22 4
V. Structuring The Change
A. The Restatement Alternative
The draft of Revised Restatement section 823 recognizes that, without
more, a strict rule requiring judgment in a foreign currency would be no
more appropriate than a rule always requiring judgment to be in U.S.
dollars. The entire section reads as follows:
§ 823. Obligations in Foreign Currency: Law of the United States
(1) Courts in the United States ordinarily give judgment on causes of
action arising in another state, or denominated in a foreign currency, in
United States dollars, but they are not precluded from giving judgment in
the currency in which the obligation is denominated or the loss was
incurred.
(2) If the court gives judgment in dollars in accordance with Subsection
(1), the conversion is to be made at such rate as to make the creditor whole
221. See supra note 95.
222. Id. § 823(2).
223. "If the foreign currency has depreciated since the injury or breach, judgment should
be given at the rate of exchange applicable on the date of injury or breach; if the foreign
currency has appreciated since the injury or breach, judgment should be given at the rate of
exchange applicable on the date of judgment or the date of payment." Id. § 853, comment c.
This position would not in all cases be consistent with the earlier statement in the same com-
ment that, "[n]either party should receive a windfall nor be penalized as a result of currency
conversion." Id.
224. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 91, § 49; 5 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW
OF CoNTRAcTs § 1338 (rev. ed. 1937); W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 2,
at 7 (5th ed. 1984); U.C.C. § 3-107(2); A. NUSSBAUM, supra note 11, at 371; F. MANN, supra
note 11, at 312.
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and to avoid rewarding a debtor who has delayed in carrying out the
obligation.225
Unlike the Miliangos rule, which has been interpreted by the British Law
Commission to require that judgment now be in foreign currency in simi-
lar fact situations, 226 the Restatement rule would give the plaintiff the
option of having judgment either in the foreign currency or in U.S.
dollars.227
By allowing the plaintiff to select the currency of judgment, the Re-
statement rule fails to deal adequately with the problems of the current
rules. U.S. cases have followed the application of the home currency
judgment rule either with a finding that precedent requires conversion on
a specific date,228 or with a conviction that the risk of devaluation should
be placed on the wrongful party.229 In those jurisdictions taking the for-
mer of these two approaches, the Restatement rule will require the plain-
tiff to face the possibility of either opting for judgment in the foreign
currency (which may in fact have depreciated against the dollar during
the period in question) or judgment in U.S. dollars with conversion at an
exchange rate which may still be detrimental to the plaintiff. In either
case, where the U.S. dollar is the stronger of the two currencies, the
plaintiff will be inclined to request judgment in dollars, with the result
being that the Restatement rule will solve none of the problems of the
existing law and place the court right back where it would have other-
wise been in dealing with the problem of determining the appropriate
conversion date.2 30 Allowing the plaintiff to dictate either a pure foreign
currency judgment rule (the equivalent of a payment date rate of ex-
change under the current home currency judgment rule) or a home cur-
rency judgment rule (with the accompanying problems of existing case
225. RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 823 (Tent. Draft No. 6,
1985).
226. See supra note 220.
227. RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 823, comment c (Tent.
Draft No. 6, 1985) ("A judgment in foreign currency should be given only on the request of
the creditor . . ").
228. See, eg., Cronel Watch, S.A. v. Peterson State Bank, 565 F. Supp. 259, 262 (N.D. Ill.
1983).
229. See, e.g., Jamaica Nutrition Holdings, Ltd. v. United Shipping Co., Ltd., 643 F.2d
376 (5th Cir. 1981).
230. RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 823, comment c (Tent.
Draft No. 6, 1985):
If the court gives judgment in U.S. dollars, as is the general practice, the date used for
conversion should depend on whether the currency of obligation has appreciated or de-
preciated relative to dollars. If the foreign currency has depreciated since the injury or
breach, judgment should be given at the rate of exchange applicable on the date of injury
or breach; if the foreign currency has appreciated since the injury or breach, the judgment




law) does little to eliminate the problems the rule is meant to address. It
merely adds the payment date to the list of conversion dates available,
giving the plaintiff the choice of the most favorable conversion date.
In addition to retaining the current problem of determining whether
the breach date or judgment date is appropriate when judgment is ren-
dered in U.S. dollars, the Restatement rule fails to address the time when
a plaintiff is allowed to exercise the option of selecting the currency of
judgment. A plaintiff should not be held to its best guess at the time
initial pleadings are filed as to the foreign currency market over the
course of the coming litigation.
By stating flatly that courts in the United States are "not precluded
from giving judgment in the [foreign] currency," section 823 also ignores
completely the problems of state courts and federal courts exercising di-
versity jurisdiction in those states having statutes which may be inter-
preted to require dollar judgments.231 Given that major trading states,
including New York, California, and Louisiana,232 have such statutes,
this concern must be addressed.
Finally, the Revised Restatement rule does not directly address the
important question of pre-judgment and post-judgment interest on a for-
eign currency judgment.233 Because exchange rate fluctuations can rep-
resent, at least in part, the difference in the interest rates offered on the
two currencies involved, the application of a U.S. interest rate to a judg-
ment rendered in a foreign currency would produce an anomalous re-
sult.2 34 Both British and U.S. courts have rendered judgments
recognizing this fact.235 An appropriate rule must provide that interest
will be granted at the rate applicable to the currency of the judgment,
within the constraints of the procedural rules applicable in the jurisdic-
tion involved.
231. See supra notes 166-71 and accompanying text.
232. See supra notes 167-69 and accompanying text.
233. This issue is indirectly addressed in comment e to § 823, where it is stated:
The date for commencement of interest on an obligation or a judgment is determined by
the law of the forum, including its rules of conflict of laws. When a statutory rate of
interest is applicable in the forum, that rate must be applied, even if the judgment is given
in a foreign currency. If no statutory rate of interest is applicable, the court may, in
appropriate cases, order interest to be based on the interest rate applicable at the principal
financial center of the state issuing the currency in which the judgment is payable.
RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 823, comment e (Tent. Draft No.
6, 1985). See also supra note 230.
234. See supra notes 154-58 and accompanying text.
235. Id.
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B. An Alternative To The Restatement
Although Section 823 of the Draft Revised Restatement represents a
substantial improvement over existing case law, a better rule is possible.
The following alternative is suggested:
§ 823. Obligation in Foreign Currency: Law of the United States
(1) Courts in the United States may give judgment on causes of action
arising in another state, or denominated in a foreign currency, in U.S. cur-
rency, in foreign currency, or in an amount in U.S. currency which is the
equivalent of the amount of the obligation in the foreign currency at the
time of payment. 236
. (2) Courts should give judgment in the most appropriate currency, tak-
ing into consideration:
(a) the currency in which the obligation is denominated, if any ("cur-
rency of account/payment");
(b) the currency in which the loss was incurred ("expenditure
currency");
(c) the currency used by the plaintiff to make payment for the loss
when it occurred ("plaintiff's currency"); and
(d) The foreseeability of loss in a particular currency.
(3) If the currency in which judgment is given pursuant to subsections
(1) and (2) has depreciated in value as compared to another currency which
is related to the cause of action, a court may, in appropriate circumstances,
award damages for the loss caused by the depreciation of the judgment
currency.237
(4) In giving judgment on a foreign currency obligation, a court may
award both pre-judgment and post-judgment interest at such rate or rates
as shall be appropriate, taking into consideration the statutory rate of inter-
est, if any, otherwise applicable and the rate of interest generally available
in the market on investments made in terms of the currency in which judg-
ment is rendered.
This alternative would avoid the problems of the current version of sec-
tion 823. The last clause of subsection (1) would recognize the existence
of state statutes that create problems in granting judgment directly in a
foreign currency.238 It would afford greater consistency of result in all
jurisdictions by providing that, in those jurisdictions without limitation,
judgment could be rendered in foreign currency and, in those jurisdic-
tions having statutory limitations, judgment could be rendered in terms
of the U.S. dollar equivalent of the foreign currency amount at the pay-
ment date rate of exchange.
236. Compare Ontario Courts of Justice Act, supra note 85, § 131 (1). See also supra note
206.
237. Compare Ontario Courts of Justice Act, supra note 85, § 131(3).
238. See supra notes 164-71 and accompanying text.
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Subsection (2) of the proposed alternative would not provide the plain-
tiff with an unfettered choice in determining the currency of judgment.
It would allow a court to render judgment in the foreign currency only
when appropriate and not simply to comply with the plaintiff's request.
Although this is contrary to the interpretation of Miliangos provided by
the British Law Commission 239 it is consistent with the position taken in
English cases and commentaries subsequent to Miliangos.24°
Subsection (3) addresses the problems of the current system of applica-
tion of the breach date and judgment date rules. The courts in various
U.S. jurisdictions are often uncertain as to which rule to apply.241 How-
ever, there is a consistent attempt to prevent the breaching or tortious
party from benefiting from any currency fluctuation. 242 If the choice of
currency pursuant to subsection (2) means the plaintiff would otherwise
suffer a post-breach or post-injury loss resulting from the fluctuation of
exchange rates, the court could address this loss directly through the rule
of subsection (3), rather than indirectly by hiding compensation for the
loss through a distortion of the breach date and judgment date analysis
as often occurs now.
The compensation allowed by subsection (3) may at first appear to
present problems when placed against well-established rules regarding
damages. This is particularly so in a contract case where the breach con-
sists of the failure to pay an amount of money when due. In the 1881
Supreme Court case of Loudon v. Taxing Dist. of Shelby County,243 the
city of Memphis failed to make timely payment to a contractor and the
contractor was forced to borrow at extremely high rates in order to con-
tinue work. In refusing to award the contractor damages for the ex-
traordinary interest and for discounts on securities sold to raise the
necessary money to continue work, Chief Justice Waite set down the
rather blunt rule that
all damages for delay in the payment of money owing upon contract are
provided for in the allowance of interest, which is in the nature of damages
for withholding money that is due. The law assumes that interest is the
measure of all such damages.244
Williston has recognized the firmness of this rule where only a single
currency is involved:
239. See supra note 220.
240. Id.
241. See supra notes 135-37 and accompanying text.
242. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
243. 104 U.S. 771 (1881).
244. Id. at 774.
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Where the defendant is under a unilateral or independent obligation to pay
a liquidated sum of money, the ordinary measure of damages for non-per-
formance is the sum of money itself with interest at the legal rate from the
time when it was due. In an action by a creditor against his debtor for the
non-payment of the debt, no other damages are ever allowed. 245
This rule of damages, if carried over to a foreign currency liability, would
appear to prevent a court from granting judgment for the amount due,
plus interest, plus an adjustment for exchange rate fluctuation. However,
courts have indirectly reached the same result by working such recovery
into the selection of either the breach date or judgment date rate of ex-
change. Even Williston, despite his strident support for the principle of
nominalism when the forum currency is involved, recognizes the unique
circumstances existing when the subject is a foreign currency claim.246
In making this distinction, Williston quotes heavily from the Third Cir-
cuit decision of Krauss v. Greenbarg,247 which, although not a foreign
currency liability case, allowed consequential damages based upon the
rule that, "knowledge of facts which makes special damages foreseeable
imposes liability therefore. ' 248 Thus, Williston has at least indirectly
recognized a claim for consequential damages in the form of compensa-
tion for losses due to currency exchange rate fluctuation. 249
The issue of nominalism was faced squarely by the British Law Com-
mission when it recognized the "long-established principle that (apart
from any question of interest) in general only nominal damages are re-
coverable for failure to pay money. '250 After noting judicial and aca-
demic criticism of the rule, and judicial exceptions which had been
carved out, the Law Commission went on to suggest that "the rule does
not apply where substantial damages are within the contemplation of the
parties. ' 251 For this proposition, the Law Commission referred to
245. 11 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CoNTRAcTs § 1410 (3d ed. 1968).
246. Id. § 1410A.
247. 137 F.2d 569 (3d Cir. 1943).
248. Id. at 571.
249. This conclusion is open to dispute as not having been explicitly stated in 11 S. WIL-
LISTON, supra note 245, § 1410A. Rather than discussing the application of the foreseeability
concept to foreign currency claims, Williston follows the discussion of the Krauss case with a
review of the U.S. cases adopting the breach date and judgment date exchange rules. How-
ever, the consequential damages position is further supported in a closely-related section, in
which the firm rule of § 1410 is tempered by the recognition that, "special consequential dam-
ages arising after the breach are recoverable." Id. § 1413.
250. Law Commission Report No. 124, supra note 155, 2.34 (citing London, Chatham
and Dover Railway Co. v. South Eastern Railway Co., [1893] A.C. 429).
251. Id. The European Convention on Foreign Money Liabilities extends this principle
even further by recognizing "the principle that the debtor who fails to pay at the proper time is
liable to make good the prejudice which the creditor may suffer as a result of depreciation,
however slight, of the money of account in relation to the money of the place of payment,
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which occurs after the proper date for payment." COUNCIL OF EUROPE, EXPLANATORY RE-
PORT ON THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON FOREIGN MONEY LIABILITIES 10 (1968) (em-
phasis added). The European Convention takes an approach similar to that suggested here:
Article 1
1. A sum of money due in a currency which is not that of the place of payment may be
paid in the currency of the place of payment, unless a different intention of the parties
appears, or a different usage is applicable.
2. The debtor may not avail himself of this option if he knows or ought to know that
payment in the currency of the place of payment would involve for the creditor a substan-
tial prejudice.
Article 2
If a sum of money is due in a currency other than that of the place of payment, the
creditor may, if the debtor is unable, or alleges his inability, to make settlement in that
currency, require payment in the currency of the place of payment.
Article 3
If, in accordance with Article I or 2, the debtor pays in the currency of the place of
payment, the conversion shall be effected at the rate of exchange at the date of actual
payment.
Article 4
1. If the debtor does not pay at the date of maturity and if after such date the currency
in which the sum of money is due depreciates in relation to the currency of the place of
payment, the debtor, whether he pays in the currency due or in the currency of the place
of payment as provided in the preceding Articles, shall pay an additional amount
equivalent to the difference between the rate of exchange at the date of maturity and the
date of actual payment.
2. Nevertheless, the above-mentioned additional amount shall not be payable to the ex-
tent that the inability of the debtor is due to default of the creditor, or to force majeure, or
the creditor has not suffered loss resulting from the depreciation. The debtor bears the
burden of proof.
3. The provisions of paragraph 1 do not in any way limit other rights which the creditor
may be in a position to claim from the debtor.
Article 5
In the event of any proceedings for the recovery of a sum of money expressed in a
currency other than that of the forum, the creditor may, at his choice, demand payment
in the currency to which he is entitled or the equivalent in the currency of the forum at
the rate of exchange at the date of actual payment.
Article 6
Article 4 remains applicable even if during proceedings instituted in conformity with
Article 5, the currency in which the sum of money is due depreciates in relation to the
currency of the place of payment.
Article 7
1. If a judgment entitles the creditor either to a sum of money in a currency other than
that of the forum or the equivalent of such a sum in the currency of the forum, and a
depreciation of the currency other than that of the forum in relation to that of the forum
occurs between the date of the judgment and the date of actual payment, the debtor is
obliged to pay an additional amount corresponding to the difference between the rate of
exchange at the date of the judgment and the date of actual payment.
2. The provisions of paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 4 shall apply mutatis mutandis.
Article 8
The place of payment referred to in the preceding Articles shall be the place where
payment is due.
Article 9
For the application of the preceding Articles the rate of exchange shall be that intended
by the parties, or, failing such intention, that which may enable the creditor to procure
the sum due without delay. Usages shall be taken into account.
Id., Annex. Europ. T.S. No. 60. The Convention was signed by Austria, France, West Ger-
many and Luxembourg in 1967 but never ratified by any party. 2 COUNCIL OF EUROPE,
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Wadsworth v. Lydall,252 a Court of Appeal case in which a party to a
contract was held entitled to special damages of interest and costs of ob-
taining a substitute mortgage where the other party to the contract had
failed to pay money for the delivery of title to land when due. Although
the Wadsworth case did not involve a foreign currency liability, the case
of Ozalid Group (Export) Ltd. v. African Continental Bank Ltd.,253
presented the problem in the foreign currency context when it addressed
the question of compensation for late payment. The failure of the debtor
to make timely payment of money due under a contract meant that the
creditors suffered from a decline in the value of the dollar against the
pound between the due date and the date of actual payment. The court
found the loss to be foreseeable and held the creditors entitled to
compensation. 254
Both the foreign currency liability exception to the Loudon rule in the
United States and the Ozalid Group gloss on judicial commentary in Eng-
land represent a maturation of the application of Anglo-American legal
principles rooted in Hadley v. Baxendale.255 There it was stated that
damages recoverable for breach of contract must be:
such as may fairly and reasonably be considered either arising naturally, i.e.
according to the usual course of things, from such breach of contract itself,
or such as may reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation
of both parties, at the time they made the contract, as the probable result of
the breach of it.256
Although the principle of nominalism remains well-entrenched in Anglo-
American law when a forum currency transaction is involved,257 the
complexities of multiple-currency transactions make its application inap-
propriate. Allowing damages for losses arising from post-breach ex-
change rate fluctuation is consistent with the development of the Loudon
rule in the United States and the similar rule in England. 258 Today it is
EUROPEAN CONVENTIONS AND AGREEMENTS 316 (1972). "It did not become effective, be-
cause most countries did not need it and Britain stood aloof until the events of 1975 made it
there largely superfluous." F. MANN, supra note 11, at 351.
252. [1981] 1 W.L.R. 598 (C.A.).
253. [1979] 2 Lloyd's L.R. 231 (Q.B.).
254. Id. at 233.
255. 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854).
256. Id. at 151.
257. 11 S. WILLISTON, supra note 245, § 1410A. See, e.g., Meinrath v. Singer Co., 87
F.R.D. 422, 426-27 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
258. See F. MANN, supra note 11, at 348:
If the foreign currency depreciates in terms of sterling the law [of England] as it now
stands allows the creditor to recover the amount of foreign currency he is entitled to and
does not attempt to compensate him for the loss which he suffers as a result of the debtor's
default in discharging his obligations. The consequences of that default have to be de-




difficult, if not impossible, to assume that the possibility of loss as a result
of exchange rate fluctuation occurring after a breach of contract or com-
mission of a tort is not foreseeable. Even if this argument could have
been made in the past, since the end of fixed exchange rates in 1971,259
the fluctuation of rates has become an everyday fact of life in interna-
tional commerce. Particularly in the contract setting, where the parties
have already dealt with explicit allocation of the risk of exchange rate
fluctuation for the duration of the contract by selecting a currency of
payment, it would be absurd to argue that the parties did not foresee that
the risk of exchange rate fluctuation would continue upon breach.
Neither is it fair to assume that, had the matter been negotiated, the risk
of post-breach fluctuation would have been allocated the same as it was
prior to the negotiated performance date.
Finally, subsection (4) is directed at the problem of matching the inter-
est rate to the currency of judgment. Without such a rule, it is possible
that a court would render judgment in one currency and apply the inter-
est rate relevant to another currency at either the pre-judgment stage, the
post-judgment stage, or both. The result would be inappropriate in a
world in which international commerce has become a part of everyday
life for so many.
VI. Conclusion
Those who participate in transnational transactions are faced with in-
creasingly complex problems. The judicial system should not impose ad-
ditional burdens on these transactions. The traditional judicial response
to liabilities expressed in a foreign currency has created legal rules no
longer supported by a justifiable rationale. The British, through the de-
velopments leading up to and later expounding upon the House of Lords
decision in Miliangos have provided us with a thoughtful example for the
development of American law. Using this blueprint with caution allows
us to develop a rational response to today's commercial world which
avoids the corruption of the traditional home currency judgment conver-
sion date rules.
than the creation of rights, but by the proper law of the contract or the substantive law
governing the particular obligation under consideration. Where the applicable law is Eng-
lish it is, therefore, most important in the interest of justice and in accordance with sug-
gestions made earlier in this book to develop a sound rule permitting the recovery of
damages for the loss caused by the depreciation of foreign money-a rule such as many
foreign countries have evolved and which, it is submitted, is or ought to be concomitant to
the modem English law.
259. See supra note 1.
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Section 823 of the Revised Restatement moves in the right direction.
It recognizes that U.S. courts can give judgment in a foreign currency.
However, it retains the baggage of the awkward and easily manipulated
home currency judgment conversion date rules. U.S. courts have tradi-
tionally recognized indirectly that loss resulting from currency exchange
rate fluctuation following a tort or breach of contract is compensable but
have done so through inconsistent application of the existing set of rules.
The inclusion of a Restatement section which for the first time deals with
the issue of judgment on foreign currency liabilities provides an opportu-
nity for clear leadership in legal development. This opportunity should
not be wasted. A new rule should recognize and deal with all the
problems inherent in the existing system, as well as provide a framework
compatible with current commercial practice.
The Draft Revised Restatement provision acknowledges that the first
step of recognizing that U.S. courts can grant judgment in a foreign cur-
rency is both a possible and desirable adjustment of the U.S. rule. It has
not, however, dealt adequately with the traditional problems encountered
by U.S. courts in dealing with the precedential availability of only the
breach date and judgment date exchange rates when a judgment on a
foreign currency liability is expressed in U.S. dollars. This step requires
recognition that compensation for post-injury exchange rate fluctuation
is reasonably foreseeable, and therefore compensable under traditional
theories of damages, and has traditionally been awarded, albeit in a
roundabout way through the contortion of the breach date/judgment
date analysis. If we are going to rid ourselves of the problems of the
procedural home currency judgment requirement, we should at the same
time avail ourselves of the opportunity to leave behind the problems of
the substantive breach date/judgment date straitjacket.
Once we recognize that the law does not require that a judgment be
rendered in U.S. currency when a foreign currency better expresses the
damages involved, we should provide for judgment in the appropriate
currency, whether foreign or domestic, and award consequential dam-
ages for any additional loss resulting from exchange rate fluctuation.
Doing so will avoid the problems of using currency conversion and
choice of law rules which were developed to indirectly provide compen-
sation for foreseeable consequential damages at a time when it was as-
sumed that foreign currency judgments were not available. This will not
create different results in the cases. It will merely allow courts to express
their rationale in a straightforward and honest fashion.
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